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FBIS-EEU-91-069 *10 April 1991*

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Prime Minister Denies Dissension in Cabinet

AU0904190891 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1630 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Statement by Prime Minister Dimitur Popov to Bilyanka Mikhaylova after session of the Council of Ministers in Sofia on 9 April—recorded]

[Text] I consider the work of the Council of Ministers on carrying out its program and, in particular, on the start of stage two of the economic reform, satisfactory.

In the past few days certain political views expressed by the main political forces are becoming more pointed. This is quite understandable and cannot, in my view, have any effect on the work of the Council of Ministers.

I would also like to say that within the Council of Ministers all its members, irrespective of their political affiliations, are working at a good pace, as everybody knows, and in consensus. We may have disputes among ourselves when we are trying to reach a decision on an issue by means of discussion. Once we make the decision, however, it is a joint decision of all the members of the Council of Ministers. I would not be able to find any journalist or political commentator who has passed a judgment on the fullness and precision of one of other of our decisions. As prime minister, I am bound to say that it is impossible to accept certain allegations that some members of the Council of Ministers are by their actions hindering the reform, or the implementation of the Council of Ministers's decisions. I would be very pleased—and I hope that this will also be the view of all members of the Council of Ministers—if evidence can be produced of any member of the Council of Ministers using his position in way that is truly inappropriate. As for the political activity of cabinet members outside the confines of the Council of Ministers, here it might be possible to reach conclusions based on different criteria.

I also wish to emphasize that there is not a single member of the Council of Ministers who does not share the common views of this institution and does not agree with its decisions.

[Mikhaylova] Mr. Popov described as groundless the criticisms made concerning the line followed by Mr. Pushkarov's ministry and, in particular, the accusations of the absence of such a line and program. He also described as without foundation the accusations directed against Mr. Tomov to the effect that by his work in the Council of Ministers and the position he had adopted he was allegedly blocking the execution of the economic reform.

Popov, Tomov on Government's Work

AU0904202691 Sofia BTA in English 1958 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] Sofia, April 9 (BTA)—Today Prime Minister Dimitur Popov once again refuted as totally groundless the publications which have appeared in the Bulgarian press about "arguments, disagreements and resignations," in the coalition cabinet. Mr. Popov said that all members of the Council of Ministers are working for the success of the economic reform as actively as ever.

After today's meeting of the cabinet, the prime minister urged all political forces to support the government's actions in the second stage of the reform: economic restructuring through demonopolization, decentralization, and the beginning of privatization. He added that the cabinet's socio-economic policy is based on the political agreement signed by the parliamentary parties, and called them to support the structural reform despite its initial unpopular consequences.

Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandur Tomov said that a suspension of the reform in the next few months is out of the question. He predicts hyperinflation and an economic slump if active economic restructuring is obstructed for any reason. According to Mr. Tomov, active restructuring is a must after the restrictive policy pursued so far which lead to a relative stabilization of the monetary balance and of the market.

Chances of Legislative Crisis Viewed

AU1004074491 Sofia BTA in English 2044 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Evgeniya Drumeva report]

[Text] Sofia, April 9 (BTA)—The major question asked today in the lobby is whether the present parliament will go on working, or a new one will be elected in June.

The parliamentary Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) is divided in two on this problem. One of the groups voiced its stand in a declaration last week: If parliament is unable to pass a constitution by a fixed date, it should dissolve itself and new general elections should be held in June. This declaration was signed by 50 plus MP's of the SDS out of 144. The signers are categorically for elections in June. They hope they will be backed by more opposition MP's. They are firm in their view that the present parliament cannot work because of the majority of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). For them, even a parliamentary crisis is justified as a means leading to new elections. Yesterday's SDS rally adopted a resolution calling for parliamentary elections in June.

However, it became known today that a counter-declaration was made at the meeting of the parliamentary group of the SDS. Some thirty MP's, mainly of Ecoglasnost and the Green Party, insist that the present parliament should continue working and that new general elections should be held after the passage of the constitution. The exact content of the declaration was not released today.

A MP of the SDS, who declined to be named, told a BTA reporter today that the contradictions in the SDS have

reached a point where a split can be expected. The disagreements over the timing of the elections were only the "tip of the iceberg."

The parliamentary Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS), which is the third biggest group with its 23 seats, is for general elections in June. A MP of the DPS told a BTA reporter that the DPS prefers the new parliament to be elected under the Elections Act which is operative now, therefore, a parliamentary crisis should lead to the new elections before the new constitution and new elections act are passed. The DPS is anxious that it may not qualify for registration under the new elections act because it is not a political party. "If the SDS walks out, we will follow suit, only two or three of our MP's will remain in parliament," said the MP who preferred to remain anonymous.

The parliamentary Agrarian Party (BZNS) stated last week that it is for elections after the passage of the new constitution.

At a press conference held here today, Mr. Chavdar Kyuranov, deputy chairman of the BSP said: "It is not possible to achieve democracy through antidemocratic means. And this was precisely the case today when a part of the opposition raised the question of the parliament's dissolution. This cannot but disturb us and proves that we have not learnt the lessons of our own history."

The BSP will use all legal means for preserving the Grand National Assembly. It will try to persuade a sufficient part of the MP's to remain in parliament so that it can continue its work. The BSP leaders believe that along with the government and the president, parliament is one of the three mainstays of the reform and in the present stage it should be preserved as it is so that the peaceful transition can continue, Mr. Kyuranov said. Otherwise the Socialists believe that the country may be thrown into chaos, anarchy and lawlessness which will be of dramatic consequences.

SDS, BSP Officials Position on Elections

AU0904115491 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Interview with SDS member Stoyen Ganev and BSP member Petur Balabanov by Elena Shtereva in Sofia; date not given—live or recorded]

[Text] Against the background of the resolution adopted yesterday [8 April] by the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS], according to which the SDS members of the Grand National Assembly will walk out by 19 April, and the president should announce new legislative elections during the second half of June, Elena Shtereva invited representatives of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] and the SDS to our studio at the Grand National Assembly.

[Shtereva] Stoyan Ganev from the SDS and Petur Balabanov from the BSP are with me. I do not doubt that their parties' positions are still in the process of being clarified, but I would like to hear more details from them. I will ask Stoyan Ganev to talk first.

[Ganev] I would say that our strategy is clear. We are for immediate elections, namely, elections in June, because it is possible to organize and conduct them then. If you ask me why, I can reply that the answer is clear. Most of the people understand that the economic reform has begun. However, at present the reform is in mortal danger, because the undefeated neocommunist nomenklatura is conducting a real war against it. If we do not hold elections soon, we will waste the country's opportunity to overcome this situation, caused by the other political force, which does not want elections. Why they do not want elections is clear: They need more time to entrench themselves even more in the economic structures of the government. In addition, let us not forget that very important revelations are expected any moment. Trials will begin soon. This will be a judicial procedure against people who are not members of the Grand National Assembly and do not enjoy immunity. Perhaps some gentlemen from the left side of the legislative hall are afraid that despite their immunity they, too, could find themselves in the court as defendants.

[Shtereva] Petur Balabanov will clarify the BSP's position on this matter. I have an additional question, however, for Mr. Ganev. Do all legislative groups within the SDS agree to everything you say?

[Ganev] I would say that at the moment a process of consolidating around the positions on holding the elections in June is taking place. More and more legislators are joining the declaration of the 48. From what I understand they already number about 70. Dr. Dertliev and the legislative group of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party also joined the declaration. In the next few days the number will grow further. Thus it is realistic to say that within several days I could categorically say what the SDS will do in the legislature. Nevertheless, the political decision already exists. Yesterday, at the meeting of the Coordinating Council in Sofia, the position on holding the elections in June was again confirmed. This was done not to save the SDS, as some people say, but to save Bulgaria.

[Shtereva] Mr. Balabanov, what do people say at the moment in the BSP in connection with this challenge?

[Balabanov] At the moment the position of the BSP is being clarified at a meeting of its Presidium. Thus by the end of the day we will have a clear political position on this issue. As a representative of the BSP, who is not afraid of any court procedure, because I am absolutely clean and there is no reason to prosecute me for my past activity, I would like to say that we were puzzled by the fact that it is possible that within 48 hours people who have expressed a certain opinion in the legislature and confirmed it with their signatures, can diametrically change their position. What do we have here in fact? At a moment when the legislature has a real opportunity to finally begin work on adopting the laws that could give momentum to the

economic reform, and especially the Law on Privatization, for which Mr. Yordanov and Mr. Markov are pleading for more than a month, suddenly it is proposed to interrupt the legislture's work not for two months, as they say, but actually for three or even four months. I cannot imagine that the new legislature will be able to begin productive work two days after the elections.

Therefore, we think that interrupting legislative work on those laws would be an unjustified blow against the government, which implements the economic reform, against Bulgarian businessmen, who expect the privatization to begin this summer, and against the Bulgarian people, who will have to wait for at least six months, until the new laws are adopted. Thus, we deem it unjustified to interrupt legislative work precisely when this work is really becoming productive and fruitful.

Today we begin discussion of the trade bill, and by the end of the week, the privatization bill should be placed on the agenda, as the relevant commissions reported. Who is interested in blocking those bills? This is a question, that I personally cannot answer.

[Shtereva] Indeed, you both asked important questions. We will wait for the answers later on this week.

BZNS on Responsibility for Collaboration

AU0904140991 Sofia ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME in Bulgarian 4 Apr 91 p 1

[Editorial: "Categorical and Truthful Answer"]

[Text] We could state without exaggerating that nearly every passing day in 1990 and 1991 was marked by significant events for our country's history, and hence, it is quite natural that the answers to all questions that we are concerned about in our progress toward a true people's power will become even more precise and more specific after having withstood the test of time. Nevertheless, the pace of events is increasingly dynamic today and therefore our reborn organization, the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union [BZNS], should accelerate the pace of its further progress. Its activities should become more resolute, but also more prudent, so each wrong step may be immediately corrected.

In this context the BZNS's supreme executive body, namely the Permanent Board, at its session held last Saturday [30 March], stated with satisfaction that our organization is worthily contributing to a change in the political system of our long-suffering country amidst the complicated and controversial processes of the transition to democracy. The BZNS leadership has integrated the principles of the constitutional-legislative democracy in its program. Our party stands by its role in providing political guarantees for our citizens' rights and freedoms. Through its members of parliament and cabinet, the BZNS actively participates in overcoming the political, economic, and intellectual crisis that affects our country. It was unanimously agreed that our deputies are contributing to legislative work with their own original ideas. They actively and usefully participate in all legislative debates, while their contribution to the final results is evident. On the other hand, the BZNS willingly and in a spirit of solidarity decided to share the heavy burden of the first non-communist government in the post-totalitarian era that is universally called the "government of hope" and that accepted the risk of promoting the economic reform in a devastated country. Our two BZNS ministers who are responsible for the sectors of foreign policy and agriculture earned the greatest credit for the fact that our present-day foreign policy, which accepted the country's aspirations of searching for a place in Europe as its only guideline, has already achieved a new image, and for the fact that, after the land bill — which embodies the basic principles of our initial draft — was passed, the agrarian reform has already gathered momentum.

Perhaps we, the united agrarians, will further analyze the results of the 1990 elections, but the most important lesson we learned from them should be remembered. For precisely this reason, the BZNS was perhaps the first among the political forces to adopt a resolute stand on the upcoming local and National Assembly elections, which was published in advance and immediately confirmed as a formal decision of the party's supreme organ. The most significant aspect of our stand is that the BZNS will run for the elections as a totally independent political party with its orange ballot. The BZNS will run as an independent opposition force against the power monopoly of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP], and is resolved to cooperate and join in coordinated actions with the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] and with other democratic, opposition forces.

This is one of the guarantees for success. It is not the only one. As nearly all participants in the debates pointed out, the success of the BZNS will depend on our election campaign, which should not only be effective and sensible, but should be conducted with daring tactical skill. Our success will depend, above all, on the qualifications of our candidates, on their political and civic behavior. Their authoritative performance will consolidate the growing prestige of our organization as a whole.

As for the most appropriate date for the upcoming elections, it is significant to stress that the BZNS's viewpoint on this question was confirmed during the parliamentary debates by both sides: Work should be speeded up but not be too hasty, and after adopting the most urgent laws, local government elections should be held in the first place, namely around June 1991, while National Assembly elections should be scheduled as soon as possible, but not before the new Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria has been adopted.

Having totally rejected the humiliating form of cooperation with the Communist Party, having distanced itself step by step from the figures who disgraced the image of the BZNS, the BZNS Permanent Board at its session

held on 30 April formally confirmed the break with the past in a most dignified manner! The report submitted by the Commission on Establishing the Political Guilt and Responsibility of the BZNS Leaders Within the 1947-1989 Period and on Accounting for Material Losses Caused to the BZNS, expressed regret for the uselessly wasted years and angrily reprimanded the handful of traitors who misled thousands of honest united agrarians in serving alien interests. Thus, the BZNS leadership pledged to close the last page of its past aberrations.... In its decision the Permanent Board denounced and distanced itself from the political line conducted by the aforementioned leaders that resulted in the total obliteration of the BZNS, depriving the party of its independence.

Nevertheless, in assuming political responsibility for the passive attitude of the BZNS under the totalitarian regime, which brought Bulgaria into an extremely difficult economic and moral crisis, the Permanent Board resolutely rejects any attempts and insinuations of other political forces to make thousands of decent BZNS members, raised with the democratic traditions of the union, feel guilty for the past. Those who carried the torch of agrarian ideas throughout the years of totalitarian darkness and who safeguarded the honored names of the first teachers, builders, and martyrs of the agrarian movement for the future generations should not be blamed.

Did the BZNS Permanent Board answer the questions raised at the beginning of this article? It did so to a great extent, but it also discussed a question we did not ask, namely the question that along with its recent upsurge, our organization is also occasionally marked by passive attitudes, a lack of initiative, indecision, and unwillingness to assume responsibility for political decisions, that even some of the Permanent Board members are unaware of the role assigned to them as BZNS leaders of their native region.... Nevertheless, it shows that the executive arm of the union congress has overcome its initial lethargy and as we pointed out in our headline, is successfully learning to provide topical, categorical, and correct answers to all questions concerning the rebirth of the BZNS.

Student Strike Seen as Prelude to Ultimatum

AU0904112691 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 5 Apr 91 p 2

[Mila Delyanova report: "Student Strike Could Be Prelude to 'Podkrepa' Ultimatum"]

[Text] Well-informed sources claim that the Federation of Independent Student Associations and the National Student Confederation are ready for a new sit-in strike.

The students will use the unfulfilled demands to establish a students' labor exchange, and dissatisfaction with the decision of the government to pay the students who do not have a stipend, a lump-sum payment of 130 leva, rather than a monthly payment of the same amount, as formal grounds for the strike.

For the time being the representatives of the Northern Center of the National Student Confederation have declared their readiness to strike. At a meeting with his supporters on 3 April, Stelyan Stoychev from the Federation of Independent Student Associations, who is a member of the Grand National Assembly, announced that his organization will support the demands of the other students. Marin Bozhkov, vice president of the National Student Confederation, said to a DUMA reporter that a massive action in northern Bulgaria will lead to a national strike. A colleague of his added that a sit-in in the higher educational establishments is being prepared.

Representatives of the two student organizations maintain that their demands are first of all of a social character. During the previous sit-in, which had purely political goals, the social and academic demands were merely a cover, certain observers think.

For the time being the sit-in is scheduled for 8 April, but its date could be postponed by several weeks. It is plausible to assume that day "X" will be determined by the "Podkrepa" Labor Confederation leaders. According to well-informed sources, the students will again combine their action with ultimatums and sociopolitical attacks, organized by the confederation, which otherwise has trade union tasks.

Yesterday [4 April], leaders and members of the Federation of National Student Associations and the National Student Confederation have consulted with Prof. Elka Konstantinova, member of the Radical-Democratic Party and chairman of the Commission on Science and Education. She will later answer their demands. The confederation has received a promise for a meeting with Dimitur Ludzhev, from whom they expect assistance in resolving the students' social problems.

New Union Opposes Ruse Sit-In

AU0904204991 Sofia BTA in English 2016 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] Sofia, April 9 (BTA)—The students' strike committee in the City of Ruse said that the sit-in in the central part of the building of the technical university has marked the beginning of a third wave of strikes in this country. However, the sit-in was opposed by the members of the organization of the Bulgarian Students' Union (BSU) founded at the higher school two weeks ago.

According to the members of the union, the sit-in violates the act on academic autonomy on the territory of the technical university and the political demands amount to an offense preventing other students, lecturers and employees from exercising their basic human rights.

The representatives of the BSU said that they would not be responsible if all this results in an open conflict between the students from the two groupings, which seems likely. The students' union maintains that its reciprocal activities should be viewed as an attempt to safeguard the rights of all students but that they will not begin before the end of the Easter holidays.

Ruse Strike; Political Demands Voiced

AU0904114691 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] A student sit-in began today at the Ruse Technical University. Last night the students occupied the central building of the university. The strike committee issued a declaration, which contains political and trade union demands. These include dissolving the Grand National Assembly, setting new parliamentary elections in May or June, admitting the guilt of the Bulgarian Socialist-Communist Party for the national catastrophe and nationalizing the party's property, and various demands related to youth activities, stipends, aid, and so forth.

The representatives of the strike committee maintain that this is the beginning of a new wave—the third—of student strikes in the country.

The Bulgarian Student Union opposes the strike. This organization was established two weeks ago in Ruse. In five different letters and appeals to the president, the Grand National Assembly, the government, the judiciary, the Chief Prosecutor's Office, the militia, the political forces, and the mass media, the members of this union demand that the organizers of the strike be prosecuted in accordance with the country's laws.

Millions Needed To Update Kozloduy Plant

AU0904150391 Sofia OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK in Bulgarian 2 Apr 91 p 1

[Text] The Commission for the Nuclear Energy Industry under the Presidency has confirmed the unsatisfactory state of nuclear safety and the need to increase the sense of responsibility of the operating personnel.

In other countries, reactors of the type of the four oldest ones used at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant have already either been shut down or made safe by special measures. As long ago as last year, OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK reported the sharp reaction of the international public and European government circles to the doubts in the safety of the Soviet reactors installed at Kozloduy.

Social tension is at a high level at the nuclear plant. Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandur Tomov explained that "it concerns the introduction of special conditions for operating the reactors and the training of specialists, who hold us and the whole of Europe hostage." It has been determined that over a two-year period $36 million will be needed to update the nuclear power plant.

Special Conditions for Reactors

AU0904175091 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1630 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Bilyana Mikhaylova report on Council of Ministers session held in Sofia on 9 April—live]

[Text] In accordance with today's agenda, the Council of Ministers finally approved a draft law on the structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which will be submitted to the Grand National Assembly at the beginning of next week.

The cabinet also adopted a decree on indexing the population's incomes in order to compensate for the rise in consumer prices. The decree relates to the months of December and January.

At today's session the government also considered other issues. I would point out that most important of these was the decision adopted to introduce special conditions for the operation of Generating Units Nos. 1-4 at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant. The special conditions in fact mean the application of a system of measures to guarantee the safety and normal operation of the four reactors. These conditions are based on the preliminary reports by international experts and are in full conformance with ecological requirements. They include improving the organization of operations and creating additional conditions for training on special procedures. It is also planned to prepare and maintain a list of radioactive waste products.

This system of measures will cost a lot of money, namely about $18 million per year, and it was precisely for this reason that the government postponed adopting this decision until now. Nonetheless, this serious and courageous decision, as Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandur Tomov described it, is today a fact.

Another important piece of news announced by Tomov is that the Council of Ministers decided to postpone the transportation of the nuclear reactor from Bratislava, which is intended for Belene. Because the fate of the proposed site of the nuclear power plant at Belene has not yet been decided, the issue of the delivery of the reactor is still undecided. It appears that one acceptable possible solution of the problem may be to install this reactor at Kozloduy.

I would also like to report that a group of ministers have accepted a proposal to make a detailed analysis of the method by which the decision was reached to build the nuclear power plant in Kozloduy.

Nuclear Safety Measures Detailed

AU0904202391 Sofia BTA in English 1941 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] Sofia, April 9 (BTA)—Today the Bulgarian Government approved a package of measures aimed at guaranteeing the complete safety of the nuclear power

plant near the town of Kozloduy. The measures, which are consistent with international standards, include: purchasing training equipment for newly appointed specialists, a rise in wages accompanied by the increased responsibility of each employee, including his liability before the law, in the operation of the plant, and the building of a new radioactive waste depot.

The cabinet gave a positive assessment to the idea for elaborating a joint Balkan nuclear power engineering policy. Bulgaria will make certain inquiries in this connection through diplomatic channels.

Sofia will rely on international support for its programme for rendering the four old Soviet VVER-440 reactors operating in the Kozloduy nuclear power station safe. This programme will require investments to the tune of 36 million U.S. dollars in the 1991-1992 period, a sum which the national budget cannot allocate. According to Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandur Tomov, who announced the government's decision, the implementation of this programme will solve a problem of regional and European importance.

Security Services Structure, Activities Viewed

AU0904142391 Sofia BTA in English 1045 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] Sofia, April 9 (BTA)—Employees of State Security Department Six complain they are the only targets of public resentment. They ask whether the political police was the only pillar of the totalitarian system. Their questions were addressed to Mr. Georgi Tambuev, chairman of the parliamentary commission on MP's files. "TRUD" carries his account today.

Mr. Tambuev quotes an anonymous employee of the former Department Six as saying that this department operated together with the other State Security structures. Department Six worked together with Department One (the Intelligence Service) and Department Two (the Counter-Intelligence Service). Their operations included: neutralizing "reactionary centers engaged in subversive activity among foreign students and postgraduates in Bulgaria," as well as "measures to foil the attempts of foreign intelligence services to use international exhibitions, congresses, symposia and fairs for anti-Bulgarian propaganda." Department Two and Department Six had been ordered to study carefully the aspirations of the enemy ideological centers and special services to infiltrate the scientific, artistic and engineering community and young people.

"We worked together," the anonymous Department Six employee says and adds: "OK, victimize us and let the other departments get away with it."

In an interview with "DEMOKRATSIYA," the daily of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces], a former employee of Department Six claims that the department still exists in another form and that State Security is the most powerful party in Bulgaria.

In connection with the MP's files this "expert" said: "In principle the files are a political speculation intended to bring political dividends to certain political forces." He believes that the submitted files might have been "modified" but he also said that it is difficult to "create" a new file.

In "OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK" Mr. Vladimir Kostov of Radio Free Europe praises the recent disclosures of Soviet ex-General Oleg Kalugin about the involvement of the KGB in the assassination of the Bulgarian emigre writer Georgi Markov in London in 1978. In his opinion, the attempts of the incumbent chiefs of the KGB headed by Kryuchkov, the ex-chief of Bulgarian State Security Dimitur Stoyanov and the Bulgarian ex-No. 1 Todor Zhivkov to dismiss his words as slander show that his disclosures have hit the mark.

Mr. Kostov suggested that Bulgarian Television or other media initiate a public conference for evidence and views. He said he was ready to participate in such a conference.

Mr. Kostov, who was the target of an assassination attempt similar to the one which killed Georgi Markov, disagrees with Mr. Kalugin's version about the time of the two attacks. The ex-General claims that the attempt on Markov's life came first and then it was followed by the operation against Mr. Kostov.

Mr. Kostov believes that he had been the earlier target. He assumes that his conduct after August 26, 1978 misled the attackers and they were led to believe that he had not been hit at all and so would be unable to disclose anything. Georgi Markov was assassinated only days later.

Zhivkov Dismisses Kalugin Allegation

AU0904183291 Sofia BTA in English 1708 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] Sofia, April 9 (BTA)—Oleg Kalugin should see a psychiatrist, Todor Zhivkov said when asked what he thought of the allegations made by former KGB General Oleg Kalugin concerning the murder of the Bulgarian emigre writer Georgi Markov.

Oleg Kalugin said recently that the Soviet secret services got involved in the assassination of the dissident Bulgarian writer at the request of Bulgaria's former minister of the interior Dimitur Stoyanov and, respectively, of Todor Zhivkov.

The trial of Todor Zhivkov and his closest aide Milko Balev has been going on for a month and a half now.

Witness Petur Tanchev, former secretary of the Bulgarian Agrarian party (BZNS), said in court that the Agrarians coordinated all their policies, and particularly their economic policy, with that of former Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP).

The top BZNS officials received the same personal allowances as the higher BCP nomenklatura. According to Petur Tanchev, the BZNS secretary enjoyed the same privileges as the members of the former Politburo of the CC [Central Committee] of the BCP.

The former BZNS leader denied any interference of the BCP in the BZNS cadre policy.

Today the witnesses spoke mainly of the fees Todor Zhivkov and Milko Balev received for the publication of Zhivkov's collected works.

Fuel Supplies Limited; No Price Rise Foreseen

AU0904150591 Sofia OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK in Bulgarian 2 Apr 91 p 1

[Text] "The Council of Ministers has not raised or discussed the issue of increasing the prices of gasoline and other liquid fuels," stated Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman Aleksandur Tomov. "It is not possible for their prices to remain fixed in the future, but the problem is when the prices will be freed."

Gasoline prices are unlikely to be changed at the end of April, and the ration coupons for April are guaranteed at the current prices. Liquid fuel supplies will be adequate, provided that speculation does not flare up again and the gasoline cans from the labor collective farms are not transferred to private cellars.

Environment Cooperation Talks Start With USSR

AU0904205291 Sofia BTA in English 2018 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] Sofia, April 9 (BTA)—The first session of the Bulgaro-Soviet Commission for Cooperation in Environmental Protection opened here today. Its major task is to set up joint working groups to tackle the environmental problems common to the two countries. Special attention will be paid to the status of the commission, coordinating Bulgarian and Soviet actions for the protection of flora and fauna in the northern part of the Black Sea.

The session will sign an agreement on bilateral cooperation in environmental protection.

Prague Police Investigate Iraqi Embassy Shooting

AU0904132291 Prague CTK in English 1534 GMT 7 Apr 91

[Text] Prague April 7 (CTK)—The District Police Administration of Prague 6, where the Iraqi Embassy has its premises, has opened criminal prosecution in connection with Friday's demonstration outside the Iraqi Embassy.

On April 5, 1991, the Union of Kurdish Students staged a demonstration outside the Iraqi Embassy in Prague. Their spokesmen wanted to establish contacts with the embassy staffers and hand over the demands of the Union of Kurdish Students. A heated debate started when they were not allowed to present their demands after which probably five embassy staffers ran out of the compound armed with truncheons and attacked the demonstrators. During this incident the Iraqi Embassy staffers opened fire (they were armed with pistols and an automatic submachine gun of the 7.62 caliber). Eight shots were probably fired as eight cartridges were found on the pavement in front of the embassy.

'Text' of Memorandum on European Security

LD0904214691 Prague CTK in English 1348 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] Prague April 9 (CTK)—Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier handed here today the ambassadors of the signatory states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) a Czechoslovak memorandum on European security.

The document was also accepted by director of the CSCE Secretariat here Nils Eliasson.

Before, Dienstbier spoke before the foreign, and defence and security committees of the two houses of Czechoslovak parliament.

The following is the full text of the memorandum:

One year ago the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic came up with a proposal to establish the European Security Commission as a permanent consultative and, later, coordinative all-European platform for the questions of security on the continent. The proposal was based upon the situation which was created following the fundamental changes in Europe, especially in its central and eastern parts. A number of ideas in this proposal were in harmony with the conceptions of other countries and contributed to the birth of new institutions and mechanisms of the CSCE at the Paris summit in 1990.

Much has changed over the past year. By overcoming confrontation and division of the continent conditions for the creation of a new Europe have been established. The opening possibilities, however, bring along new risks. They stem especially from the different levels of social and economic development of European countries and also from revealed nationalistic problems. It is mostly the young democracies that are threatened, but so is also the security of the whole of Europe.

The best possibility for the reliable safeguarding of stability and development in the Europe of tomorrow is by way of harmonious interaction between the key institutions of the European security architecture - the CSCE, the North Atlantic Alliance, the European communities, the Western European union and the Council of Europe, while fully respecting their own mission. The nature of security on the European continent is manifold, and manifold also are the sources of its possible endangerment, which necessitates that various forms of interaction between European institutions be sought. The common denominator of such cooperation must be respect for the legitimate security interests of all European countries, the U.S.A. and Canada. In search of an expression of European security, the CSCE process is the only one that offers both an all-European platform and a transatlantic link of solidarity. It is from this process that the necessary impulses should come.

A security system for a new Europe is a goal to which various roads may lead. One of them should be the qualitatively new bilateral treaties concluded between a number of the CSCE member countries. They could therefore contain the provisions that the contracting parties are striving for the creation of an all-European security structure and are establishing mechanisms of bilateral consultations which could lead to the application of joint measures.

The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic submits that especially the following possibilities, offered by the CSCE process in the field of security, should be made use of even before the Helsinki follow-up meeting in 1992:

The agenda of the Berlin meeting of the CSCE council at the level of ministers of foreign affairs in June 1991 should include the question of new security structures in Europe. Primarily, an emergency mechanism should be worked out so that it be possible to convene an extraordinary CSCE session without delay. Before the Helsinki follow-up meeting one more meeting of ministers of foreign affairs and perhaps also a meeting of ministers of defence should take place in order to consider further cooperation in the field of security.

The conflict prevention centre in Vienna should, by common efforts of all 34 participating countries, as soon as possible, fulfil its mission consisting of preventing situations threatening stability and security in Europe. One of the basic conditions of success of further negotiations on disarmament and confidence building in Europe is the expeditious entry into force of the CFE treaty and its faithful implementation.

Security in Europe is indivisible and for this reason the Helsinki summit in 1992 should reach the conclusion that this continent needs a permanent political body operating in the CSCE framework and capable of reacting to topical issues. As for the future, the mechanism of European security will have to be built in a way

allowing for the use of the existing institutions as well as of the all-European fora convened to solve the critical problems of migration, national minorities, ecology, energy, and others.

In Paris last November the highest representatives of the CSCE countries founded the first institutions of the Helsinki process. This step has become the beginning of the road leading to the establishment of new cooperative security structures on the continent. But development has to go on. A primary role should be played by the new all-European disarmament forum. Functioning of the conflict prevention center should be considerably extended beyond the framework of military measures and the CSCE procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes should be strengthened. An all-European verification system for compliance with the disarmament agreements is missing. It will be necessary to take measures in the field of registration and, later, control of the sale and transfer of conventional arms and equipment.

It should be possible to consider the idea of gradually building multinational armed forces of the CSCE member states by way of bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

All these and other confidence-building measures among states cannot be realized except in loose interaction with the existing security institutions.

The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic is convinced that the Helsinki process will fulfil its historic mission only if it continues to stem from the connection between democracy, human rights, and indivisible security for all. It is through that connection that this process can gradually assume the functions guiding the strengthening of security both in Europe as a whole and in its individual regions, the Czechoslovak memorandum on European security concludes.

Pithart Responds to 'Czech' German Demands

AU0904105891 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 3 Apr 91 p 6

[Written response by Czech Prime Minister Petr Pithart to the interpellation regarding the Sudeten Germans' property: "Properties Will Not Be Returned"]

[Text] As we already reported (RUDE PRAVO 28 March), Czech Prime Minister Petr Pithart responded in writing to five Czech National Council deputies' interpellation regarding the possibility of returning properties to the Sudeten Germans. Today we publish the full text of the prime minister's response:

The concerns that the former properties of Sudeten Germans would be returned arise from a misunderstanding of the privatization intentions of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic Government. These intentions are based on the assumption that in the given historical and political situation and with the given economic potential, properties expropriated prior to February 25, 1948 will not be returned. Should this principle not be respected, the transformation of the Czechoslovak economy would be threatened, and additional injustices would occur (this was inferred on 25 October 1990, when the Federal Assembly dealt with and decided on the small privatization).

There is also another fundamental reason that must not be overlooked: The legal political acts from before February 1948 were still adopted on legitimate democratic grounds and in the framework of a state based on the rule of law. The fact that some of them can be critically assessed or even rejected does not change the situation in the least.

The general Czechoslovak policy with respect to the Sudeten Germans is determined by two principles: by a rejection of the principle of collective guilt as unethical, and by the realistic admission of the simple truth that history does not "repeat itself." "Six years of NAZI rage sufficed for us to catch the virus of evil ... and to adopt—in just and exaggerated anger—the unethical principal of collective guilt," President Vaclav Havel said on the occasion of the visit by FRG President R. V. Weizsaecker (15 March 1990). He continued: "We will not turn back history, and therefore, instead of a free inquiry into the truth, we can do only one thing: ever again welcome those who come with peace in soul and pay tribute to the graves of their ancestors or come to look at what is left of the villages in which they were born."

It was in this spirit that the Czechoslovak representatives dealt with the FRG representatives. Federal Prime Minister Marian Calfa spoke in this vein also at his meeting with F. Neubauer, spokesman of the Sudeten German Landsmannschaft, at the end of last November. He emphasized that this stance taken by he Czechoslovak Government is not directed against the Sudeten Germans but that it is dictated by cardinal interests of a Czechoslovak state that is aware of its responsibility to itself as well as to the Europe of the future. The agreement with the FRG that is in preparation should therefore—in the words of H.D. Genscher during a meeting with J. Dienstbier—draw "a thick line" and bring the problems of the past to a close "once and for all."

According to the statement by the president of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic of 3 December 1990, Marian Calfa, during his talks with German representatives at the end of November, presented the Czechoslovak stance that was drafted with respect to the earlier discussions of Czechoslovak officials with Chancellor H. Kohl. He added that "our principal and fundamental stance cannot be projected to property-ownership demands. There would be no end to it. We could go further back in history and extenuate all the wrongs..., bill the Germans for all they have done to us, and we would end up sending bills to one another for ever more...."

The Czechoslovak Government (for this reason, among other things) does not cast any doubts on the constitutional decrees by President E. Benes dated 1945 on confiscation (Nos. 5, 12, and 108), on nationalization (Nos. 50, 100, and 101), and also on the withdrawal of citizenship (Nos. 11 and 33). They were aimed not only against the Germans and Hungarians, some categories of whom they even directly excluded, but against traitors and collaborators of Czech and Slovak nationalities. The confiscation of property without compensation, which was introduced by some of the mentioned decrees, was based on the international law that allows states to interfere with the property ownership of their citizens. The spirit of the contractual decision of the victorious powers in Potsdam is the same.

In the acts referred to earlier, the principle of collective guilt was included, but only indirectly. It came through directly, above all, in the unorganized deporting of Germans during the first weeks after the takeover, which was accompanied by numerous displays of violence, inhumanity, and unjustifiable crimes at a time of generally weakened democratic structures and unconsolidated state power.

The events that took place between Czechs and "Czech" Germans immediately after the war represent a complex combination of ethical, legal, and political questions. They can be understood in their inseparable unity only against the background of modern Czech history in general. The Munich agreement is of key importance here. For the Czech nation, this agreement was an expression of an unjust dictate by the powers that ended the existence of a democratic state with relatively broad rights for the German minority, and at the same time was a violent termination of a fruitful coexistence that had lasted for centuries (as symbolized by the Henleinian slogan "Heim ins Reich"), and an uprooting of the historical rights of the "Czech" Germans by a unilateral act of their own. For many representatives of the Sudeten Germans, Munich remained, at least to a certain extent, the fulfillment of a legitimate quest for self-determination; its misuse by Hitler is an entirely different matter for them. This stand certainly prevents their understanding of the emancipatory importance of efforts toward Czech and Slovak statehood and the positive role of the Czechoslovak state in European development. Certain perseverance on this stand—i.e. sustaining efforts to influence the FRG Government's policy—must be expected for some time to come.

The interwar Czechoslovak state certainly had its historical limitations like any other national state; these survived the war, and in a sense they still have not been overcome. However, these limitations cannot be surmounted by denying the identity of the Czech and Slovak nations. Therefore, only the prospect of the democratic integration of Europe—a prospect accepted by all participants of the Helsinki process and developed in the Paris Charter for a new Europe—can serve as the point of departure for all considerations of mutual relations between the "Czech" Germans (if they feel as such) and the Czechs. All Germans and all Czechs (regardless of their domicile) can meet on the basis of the realization of this integration. The political will and readiness to recognize this new historical and political quality of European development thus represents the most natural basis for a complete reconciliation of the two nations. Without it, everything that is connected with the building of a "common home" (native land) of all European nations cannot be realized.

The Czech Government is convinced that the steps taken on the basis of known models of a European regional cooperation that "crosses the borders" and that is based on concrete displays of the general cooperation of the border-area communities, cities, and districts are of a particularly topical interest. It is determined to create all the political, psychological, and legal conditions necessary for this cooperation.

Dienstbier Comments on Sudeten German Issue

LD0904192491 Prague Domestic Service in Slovak 1300 GMT 9 Apr

[Text] Federal Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister Jiri Dienstbier described as a provocation continued attempts by some politicians to cast doubt on the current property relations in the Czech border area in connection with the preparation of a bilateral Czechoslovak-German treaty. At today's news conference in the building of the Federal Assembly in Prague, he stressed that our border with Germany is not in question in any case, either by the Bonn government or the Sudeten-German Landsmannschaft. Jiri Dienstbier confirmed that German representatives did not demand any restitution.

Dienstbier on Treaty With FRG Defense Industry

LD0904224191 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1630 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Jan Kulhavy report on news conference by Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier with unidentified reporters at a joint session of foreign affairs, defense, and security committees of the Federal Assembly on 9 April]

[Excerpts] [Kulhavy] [passage omitted] At a news conference that followed, Minister Dienstbier singled out as "provocations" any kind of speculations or rumors that the planned treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany will cast doubt in any way on our frontiers or that it will include any property restitution claims of the Sudeten German Landsmannschaft.

The federal foreign minister also spoke about his forthcoming visit to the United States. He singled out the discussion of issues of European security and economic problems as the main aims. In this connection he answered a question about difficulties caused by the conversion of the military industry and restriction of sales of arms. Jiri Dienstbier said in alia:

[Begin Dienstbier recording] If any one has any kind of contracts, then they have to be examined; however, I doubt very much that there are any. There is no sense in exporting anything today on credit—this is a fiction. We cannot afford credits in the military industry, and these credits are mostly to countries where there is a considerable doubt wheather they would ever pay us back.

This [unspecified] is a typical example of the fact that in the building of the federation, we are going in an opposite way to that of European trends. While the European economy is being integrated, we have been for a year or so dividing the economy into two parts. If we do not stop this trend, if we do not realize that we have to go toward economic integration, then this will really have very serious consequences—and not only economic ones. [end recording]

[Kulhavy] Members of the foreign affairs, security and defense committees of both chambers of the Federal Assembly continued to deal with topics connected with the military industry, conversion, and arms sales also in the afternoon when Jiri Dienstbier was joined by Jozef Baksay, federal minister of foreign trade.

Dienstbier, Baksay Comment on Arms Export

LD0904221691 Prague CTK in English 2042 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] Prague April 9 (CTK)—Czechoslovak Foreign Trade Minister Jozef Baksay said today Czechoslovakia will continue to export arms but trade deals will be controlled by state bodies.

Baksay and Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier discussed conditions for arms sales with members of the foreign committees of the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly (parliament) today.

Dienstbier said Czechoslovak arms exports, especially of weapons such as tanks, have been declining over the past decade. Czechoslovakia lacks the technology to produce the kind of weapons for which there is demand abroad. This fact, together with reduced arms sales to third world countries, makes armaments production unmarketable, said Dienstbier.

In future only authorized organizations will be able to make arms deals with foreign partners, provided they obtain licences from the Federal Foreign Trade Ministry, Baksay said. A special commission has been set up at the ministry to control individual trade transactions.

Dlouhy: Land Restitution Will Cost 30 Billion

AU0904063191 Prague ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech 4 Apr 91 pp 1,13

["sc"-signed report on the 3 April joint meeting of Federal Assembly chambers: "An Attempt at Restoration of Justice?"]

[Excerpts] Prague— It took several minutes of ringing the bell for deputies to the People's Chamber and the Chamber of Nations of the Federal Assembly to assemble yesterday morning to resume the debate on the most important item on the agenda of the 14th joint meeting of Federal Assembly chambers: the government-sponsored bill on the arrangement of land ownership rights. [passage omitted]

By yesterday evening, 68 deputies had spoken in the debate on the bill, and a total of 98 proposals for amendments were submitted. The speakers in yesterday's debate also included Federal Minister of Economy Vladimir Dlouhy. Responding to some deputies' critical remarks about the insufficient quantification of land restitutions, he said that the price of land and of the capital on it were about the same, that claims for restitution would concern about 550,000 hectares of land, and that they would amount to approximately 30 billion korunas. As for agricultural cooperatives, restitutions would concern about 10 percent of the value of their fixed assets and inventories, after subtracting the credit burden. With respect to state farms, they would concern about 15 percent. The restitution burden of individual agricultural enterprises can be estimated at between 10 and 11 percent. [passage omitted]

Klaus Comments on Delay in Value-Added Tax

LD0904033791 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 2000 GMT 8 Apr 91

[Text] At a meeting in Pilzen today in the hall of the House of Culture which was filled to capacity, Vaclav Klaus was, above all, representing the new Civic Democratic Party [ODS]. He spent the major part of the evening answering questions from the citizens. These concerned, for example, problems with the complicated division of powers between both national republics, which he described as a tragic slowing down of the economic transformation to market principles. He pointed out that the Slovak Government is already blocking the earlier-agreed introduction of the value-added tax on a federal level. At the same time, however, he said that the so-called nationality conflicts are an artifically inflated bubble.

In the majority of replies, Vaclav Klaus explained his economic and civic concept of the future development of the country for which he was often applauded. He also deflected attacks by representatives of some other political parties, for example, Czechoslovak Social Democracy.

He said that next week he would be present at the ceremonial opening of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and that it was likely that he would become its governor. He was critical of the media, and in answer to a question as to whether he is convinced that the citizens in the country, by now, understand that the creation of economic resources is primary and that their division is secondary, Vaclav Klaus said:

[Begin Klaus recording] Well, I think that some definitely understand it. Perhaps not all understand it, but I would think that normal people understand it. I am afraid that some left-wing intellectuals, who constantly dream about something else, do not understand. [end recording]

Pilzen recently has been the target of many leading politicians and the inhabitants are asking themselves why. Many think that this is the beginning of the election campaign.

Government Approves Bill on Radio, Television

LD1004032391 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 1930 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] At its session today, the Slovak Republic Government discussed the report on implementation of its July 1990 policy statement. Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar said at a news briefing that it discussed factual suggestions and that it will submit the material to the Slovak National Council tomorrow.

The government then approved, with suggestions, the bill on Slovak Radio which is to be a new legal basis for the position, management, and functioning of this national, public-legal, information, cultural, and education institution. The independent Slovak radio organization is to be controlled by a board—an independent collective body and by a director who will be appointed by the Presidium of Slovak National Council. The government also approved, with suggestions, the bill on Slovak Television, the bill on the state fund for market regulation, the bill on chambers of commerce and industry, and also the principles of government policy toward citizens of Romany origin.

Kucerak, Coalition Parties Disagree on Sovereignty

AU0904131591 Prague CTK in English 1512 GMT 5 Apr 91

[Text] Bratislava April 5 (CTK)—Economic decline and social tensions are inevitable in Czechoslovakia during the transformation of the bureaucratic system to a market economy, Slovak Deputy Premier Jozef Kucerak said at a seminar on economic reform today.

The seminar, the first of this kind on such a level, was attended by members of the Federal, Czech, and Slovak Governments, representatives of political parties and movements, and enterprises.

Kucerak said that not only many enterprises but perhaps entire industrial branches will cease to exist because they will be unable to adapt themselves to market conditions. Between December 1990 and February 1991, the insolvency of enterprises in the Czech Republic rose from 37,800 million to 58,300 million korunas and in Slovakia, from 15,800 million to 24,000 million korunas. One of the reasons is that Czechoslovakia still manufactures a very broad range of products—70 percent of the full range made in the world. Such a small country cannot be competitive in such a broad range of products, Kucerak said.

He admitted that the criticism that price deregulation was introduced before demonopolization and privatization at the beginning of this year was at least partly justified. However, he said, prices rose only by 2 percent in February as compared to 31 percent in January, and he described this as the first proof of success of the economic reform.

Kucerak indicated that the implementation of economic reform in Slovakia may bring more conflicts than in the Czech Republic, the larger of the two Czechoslovak regions. He attributed this to a lower economic and living standard in Slovakia, a larger proportion of energy and raw material-intensive productions, lower export performance, links with unstable East European markets and a higher share of arms production in Slovakia now being switched over to non- military output than in Bohemia and Moravia.

"If someone wants to see the autonomy of the Slovak economy in the sovereignty of Slovak bodies in the economy instead of in the autonomy of economic subjects, then he is playing for power", Kucerak, a supporter of the Czechoslovak Government's blueprint for reform, said.

He added that it is highly important not only for economic but also political and constitutional reasons that the economic reform make concerted progress in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In the meantime the insolvency in the Czech Republic grew more than that in Slovakia (to 58.3 billion korunas, while the insolvency in Slovakia rose from 15.8 to 24 billion korunas).

While Kucerak, representing the Public Against Violence (VPN) movement, spoke against economic sovereignty based on nationality, representatives of the other two parties in the Slovak coalition government, the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) and the Democratic Party (DS), said that Slovakia's economic sovereignty was inevitable.

The latter view was also shared by a group calling itself the independent economic association of Slovak economists (NEZES).

Slovak Minister of Forestry and Water Economy Viliam Oberhauser, the author of KDH's blueprint for economic reform, told CTK that Slovakia's economic sovereignty is not an end in itself. Its purpose is to preserve Slovakia's identity in a future united Europe.

DS Chairman and Slovak Industry Minister Jan Holcik said that the Democratic Party is in favor of Slovakia's economic sovereignty, but with a single state of Czechs and Slovaks. This common state can develop on the principle of two equal economic subjects, he commented.

NEZES President Hvezdon Koctuch said that political sovereignty without economic sovereignty is illusory. He rejected views that Slovakia's economic sovereignty would undermine the unity of Czechoslovakia.

Communist Transfer Money to Social Democrats

AU0904142991 Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak 6 Apr 91 p 2

["BB"-signed report: "Fraternal Assistance?"]

[Text] Prague— On 27 March 1990, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia asked the Federal Ministry of Finance for a permit to transfer 10 million korunas to the account of Czechoslovak Social Democracy, which operates in Bohemia and Moravia. It received the permit and the transaction was carried out. On 16 October 1990, it asked for a permit to transfer 3 million korunas to the account of the Slovak Social Democratic Party. It received the permit but, supposedly, the money has not yet been transferred.

Meciar on Slovak Policy Statement Evaluation

LD1004035691 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 1630 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Magda Pospisilova report on news conference by Slovak Prime Minister Meciar with unidentified reporters on 9 April; place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Pospisilova] What was the reason for today's discussion of the government's policy statement? There are two theories: that the government has finally acceded to earlier calls by deputies that you give an account, or, the second one, that this report on the fulfillment of the policy statement is connected with an attempt by the Presidium to have you recalled or investigated?

[Meciar] I understand it to be the first point. The government has a duty to present proposals, or rather accounts of its activity to the Slovak National Council. We prepared this, notes on it are being completed, and it will be presented tomorrow so it can be factually discussed. I accept that other conclusions can be drawn, but I do not see any bad intentions in it.

[Popisilova] What is your feeling from this session? Can it be said that the government is functioning, or is its functioning at risk?

[Meciar] I would say this, at government sessions and during the course of discussion in the government, conflicting views do not occur, they are only of a working nature. Everything else is said outside the session of the government and outside the premises in which the members of the government are. So it is almost a matter of political propaganda on the part of some members rather than a justifiable work issue, because clearly some of the assertions would be more difficult to express in front of us.

[Unidentified reporter] What does the report contain? Is it more positive, or are there are points in it where you have to admit that not all intentions are being fulfilled?

[Meciar] The intentions are being fulfilled quite well. The work efficiency of those that were in progress is very high. If there is a problem, then it lies in the fact that when approaching economic reform we did not anticipate all factors precisely.

To be more specific: Starting points were indicators that should have been different, whether this concerns restrictive policy, or price policy, or the number of unemployed, these are developing worse than anticipated for 1991.

[Announcer] In the afternoon there was a news conference at which Culture Minister Ladislav Snopko spoke to clarify the Slovak National Council bill on Slovak Radio and Slovak Television. Jan Carnogursky, first deputy prime minister, informed journalists about the principles of the government policy toward Romanies. It is based on the principle of making them equal to other minorities living in our ocuntry. Romanies will no longer be considered as a social group that requires special care and special financial funds.

Holds New Conference

LD1004080091 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 1700 GMT 9 Apr 91

[News conference by Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar with unidentified reporters in Bratislava on 9 April—recorded]

[Text] [Reporter] Prime Minister, what is your view of the alleged secret meeting between Mr. Miklosko, Mr. Carnogursky, Mrs. Buresova, and Mr. Pithart? What is your personal view, and what is your view as a representative of the platform For Democratic Slovakia?

[Meciar] It is their own business. My talks, which I may have held in a particular place, were not usually secret. I cannot imagine what secrecy can be discussed regarding the relations between two political movements, if this was the topic. But if it was a meeting between representatives of state bodies, then the public has a right to be informed about it.

[Reporter] According to the reports that have reached the mass media, some ministers of your government hold the view that specific features have to be taken into account in the process of implementing economic reform, while others oppose this and argue that Slovakia's specific features are not at issue, but rather matters of a systemic nature within the framework of economic reform. What is your view, or rather, how was this reflected today in the course of discussion on the government's policy statement in connection with the implementation and progress of economic reform?

[Meciar] It was reflected in such a way that the two variants of the materials that were drawn up were taken

from the agenda of the session precisely because of this difference. To speak about specific features and to be unable to see them is equivalent to not being able to see what is going on. At the time of drafting this year's policies and compiling the budget, the expected unemployment was roughly 100,000. But today we know that more people will be unemployed. This is the (?factor) that should be adapted to local conditions. If we want to make economic reform specific and depart from a general thesis, we must make specific structural changes; for example, in the sphere of fuel and power, metallurgy, engineering, and conversion. All these are specific conditions, and the reform is not an abstract matter. Each enterprise has its own reform policy. On the Slovak territory, the reform has its own specific features that must be implemented. I do not wish to say that these are special features, because the very same things—structural changes—must be carried out also in the Czech Republic, and consideration must be given to the factors that are specific and feasible for each of us. Let us just take the enterprises and you will find that their state is not the same. Their equipment and technologies differ and their debt is high; in fact, it is higher than we thought. There are also many other elements representing new factors. In December when when we were compiling our goals for 1991, we simply did not expect that they would arise. The government cannot say that this will be resolved on its own. The state must still take steps to regulate these matters.

[Reporter] Mr. Prime Minister, could you please comment on a pronouncement made by Mr. Ondrus [Slovak deputy prime minister] yesterday that there is evidence of your not speaking the truth on more than one occasion and that nothing has come of it?

[Meciar] I really pity Mr. Ondrus for making these pronouncements. He must wait for the office of the prime minister to become vacant. He should be more consid- ate because one should have evidence for everything. The situation that is developing here is that many hints are coming in from outside and from within the government and that I am unable to respond to all of them, but I will find time to deal with them in earnest, because making these grave accusations goes beyond the framework of ordinary insolence since no evidence exists. On the whole, the entire polemics emanating from the VPN wing, or which is channelled via the Slovak National Council [SNR] or some government members, is on the level of general accusations without any kind of concrete evidence. They are falling one after, [words indistinct]. I am concerned that something is being cooked up behind the scenes and so on. I feel terrible pity for these people, for they are not at all aware what a demonstration of wretchedness this is. After all, let us consider the whole (?action). An investigation and other things are now in progress. I am a lawyer, and I witnessed various cases of investigation. But even the lowest thief was told what he was accused of and was investigated only afterwards. The prime minister, however, is not even worthy of being told what he is accused of. This is abnormal, and things cannot be done this way. Furthermore, no hints should be made that violence exists in the government, where pressure is exerted upon people to press three buttons at once. Pardon me for saying this, but things really cannot be done this way. So I would like to assess this not only as a crisis of confidence, which is frequently discussed, but first and foremost as a crisis of ethics of those who hold these views.

[Reporter] Concerning your understanding and presentation of the reform within the context of Slovakia—after all, we heard it several times and your view has not changed in this respect—do you think that the Slovak Government possesses sufficient powers to implement the reform in this shape?

[Meciar] I think that it possess enough powers to implement it and this, indeed, was the purpose of the drive and struggle for powers, so structural changes could be carried out on the territory of the Czech and Slovak Republics alike. The Federal Government has remained on a macroeconomic level, and the republican government must carry out its reform's specific implementation. We claim our allegiance to this thesis, because things are becoming very uncomfortable. In Slovakia, many phenomena are appearing earlier than in the Czech Republic. This is a consequence of certain historical peculiarities. It is a question of several weeks only, and they will face exactly the same worries. Some are already surfacing there.

[Reporter] Today we heard Mr. Gal voice an expectation that a suitable political situation will materialize in 10-14 days, which will enable the Slovak political representation to meet Mr. President at last. I would like to know what your own interpretation of these words is?

[Meciar] I do not know why Mr. Gal set this date. My invitation to meet Mr. President is for a much earlier date.

[Reporter] Mr. Prime Minister, how do you assess Mr. Rychetsky's pronouncement that in a particular situation, in a particular political crisis in Slovakia, the Federal Government is able to assume the intiative.

[Meciar] As an irresponsible one, because in a certain situation the Federal Government should act only if authorized by law to do so. I know of no law that would empower it to take such steps. I think that while Rychetsky wanted, or rather suggested, a referendum at the first sign of a split in the VPN, he simultaneously accused the Slovak Republic Government of not being able to function and work. You yourself can see today that it does. While speaking about hints—and I am not sure that (?he also said) that the Federal Government could do something in the case of state of emergency. The state of emergency exists only in respect to the fact that a certain group of politicians is pushing through their objectives in an unscrupulous manner, and a certain part of the population, an absolute majority of the population, those who want to protect the government and give their backing to it, because they feel that it still

can carry out their tasks. [sentence as received] But should such far-reaching conclusions be derived from it? If we considered some discussions that are taking place in the Federal Government, and if we leaked them, just like some matters are (?partly) leaked from the Slovak Government, then people would experience a much greater feeling of threat.

Meciar on Slovakia's 'Specific Conditions'

AU0904090091 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 2 Apr 91 pp 1,3

[Interview with Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by Karel Hvizdala and Jiri Leschtina; place and date not given: "Slovakia Is Different"]

[Text] [MLADA FRONTA DNES] Every politician, in order to work and remain in his post, has to have a political force or movement behind him. You have parted ways with the Public Against Violence [VPN] movement and the Christian Democratic [KDH] movement. Whom do you have behind you?

[Meciar] This is presented everywhere as my personal withdrawal. This is not my personal withdrawal; deputies from the Federal Assembly—who have their own club—deputies from the Slovak National Council [SNR], and entire districts left the VPN with me. The first meeting of the clubs was held last Saturday [23 March], and with the exception of six districts, all of them were represented there.

We feel that we belong to the center and that we make up the center and not the left. We did not want to move toward the right—a split took place. Moreover, the movement's leading personalities, pulling toward the right, wanted to play it their own way. Let me emphasize that we are the ones adhering to the VPN's program.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] How would you define the center? All sorts of people conceal themselves behind this term today.

[Meciar] I do not like to pigeonhole people because a politician can develop, a point of view can develop, and the situation can change; what is on the right today can be on the left tomorrow and vice versa. The center is represented by those who insist on implementing the VPN program, a program that was adopted as a program of the center. I consider negotiations within the framework of this program to be the center's program. We identified 12 points that roughly make up the party program. The VPN began to fulfill 10 of them and began to transform itself from a civic movement into a party with strict centralization, individual membership, obligatory passing of resolutions, and so on. We did not want this in a civic movement. As far as economic reform is concerned, it stopped accentuating the national and social aspects or they were submitted in a different form.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] In what way do you differ in your attitude toward economic reform?

[Meciar] We insist that economic reform has to have not only general principles, but that these principles also have to be applied under specific conditions. Priorities have to be determined, but not so that someone can draft a reform and make decisions about the economy's future for 20 years and not know what will be preserved and what will not. It is impossible to state that we will regulate the market and, at the same time, let it slip uncontrollably from our hands. After all, the market will be established within two or three years.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] Does this mean, then, that you foresee temporarily managing the economy from the center?

[Meciar] Temporary interventions by the state in economic processes are necessary to ensure that there are as few losses as possible. It is also necessary to determine priorities that would enable us not only to close down inefficient enterprises, but also—at the same time—to launch enterprises already in operation that have potential. Something has to pull the economy forward. Another thing in which we differ: We maintain that someone has to organize the transition to the tertiary sphere and that someone has to create systematized places, make the rules for the transition, and determine the rules for requalification.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] You are always talking about the specific conditions it is necessary to bear in mind while implementing economic reform in Slovakia. Could you clarify these specific conditions?

[Meciar] The changes have to be carried out, first and foremost, on the basis of bilateral agreements on the protection of investments, on the protection of deposited capital resources, and on the protection—or rather the regulation—of certain taxation systems so, for example, it would be advantageous to invest in Slovakia. However, the Federal Government has to permit this. When it, or the Finance Council, comes to the conclusion that this is unsuitable because—under today's system—this would involve money from the Czech Republic, then an investor will not come to Slovakia and will go somewhere else. Therefore, we have to quickly seek new mechanisms and taxation rules in the customs regulations sphere so we can find investors; however, do you know what I think is the most important thing? Taking people from our country and teaching them to think economically according to Western economic systems. All of my talks have ended in the following way: Your economists use the same economic expressions as we do, but we do not understand each other. Everyone understands something different from the same concept. Yet another issue is important: cooperation with the Eastern market. This is the thing I am most criticized for at the moment. I say that this does not involve any ideology or any threat to Czechoslovak interests, but involves the specialized products we should not leave out of the

Soviet market. When I open these doors and look for ways of operating on this market, all of a sudden doubts are cast on me as a politician and as a person because I personally want to maneuver Slovakia into the Soviet Union.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] In Martin you declared (that is, VEREJNOST of 25 March) that you held secret negotiations with Soviet generals so that they would agree to your continuing to manufacture weapons and tanks for the USSR.... These negotiations are at variance with a resolution made by the Federal Government and with a statement made by the president of the Republic....

[Meciar] You seem to know everything that is going on in Europe. The USSR is eliminating its arms stockpiles and is limiting its armament production; the Warsaw Pact is disintegrating. Slovakia has suspended its armament production. Our aim is merely to slow down this suspension of production and to adapt it to the start of new production programs that we are seeking throughout Europe. In Martin I said that doubts had been cast on this visit prior to our departure for the USSR and that some people suspected I would hold talks with Soviet generals about supplying tanks. When I laugh off such slanders, some journalists take this as confirming them. Naturally, I did not conduct any secret negotiations. If I had—could you imagine a politician who would shout about the contents of his secret negotiations on the square?

During our discussions on trade, I referred to the economic consequences of conversion in our country and we sought ways of opening up trade possibilities, at least in the other branches of production.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] You talk about the necessity of reacting quickly, but at the meeting in Martin you rejected the shock therapy on which the government's scenario for economic reform is based. Does this mean that the government's scenario for economic reform is not fully applicable under the conditions of the Slovak economy?

[Meciar] The government scenario for economic reform envisaged a specific regularity in its measures. Is this being adhered to? This is not being adhered to.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] In what way is this not being adhered to?

[Meciar] In its chronological order. For example, we assumed that price liberalization would take place in a competitive environment, in a market environment. So far, this does not exist. It is said that new things can be built on the ruins of old ones; however, this is impossible. The system for gradually transforming entire branches, entire activities, financial mechanisms, market self-regulating mechanisms, and technological changes is realistic. The current crisis encompasses not only macroeconomic relations, but also changes in the processes controlling production. As one is incompatible with the other, we will merely pull the old things down.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] In your opinion then, the introduction of price liberalization was a mistake?

[Meciar] It was a measure that caused a great deal of difficulty. This is being demonstrated in Slovakia in particular. If you take the price index, it is—on average—higher than in the Czech Lands. The 20 percent import surcharge also causes problems for us and we are mostly dependent on imports. The [economic] inputs are becoming more difficult, and the economic results of enterprise are worsening. Then I was very unpleasantly surprised by the fact that I found out about the adjustment to the koruna's rate of exchange against the dollar from the newspapers like every other citizen. As the prime minister, I should know certain things. Furthermore, I am constantly under pressure to fulfill the conditions set by the IMF, conditions I know nothing about. This is not because I do not want to know them. I ask for them, but I do not know how I can get them.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] We would still like to be more precise about one thing: You often emphasize that it is necessary to adapt the conditions for economic reform to conditions in Slovakia. Does this mean specifically that, in view of certain individual problems in Slovakia's economic structure, liberalization should have been introduced differently and that prices should be regulated differently in Slovakia?

[Meciar] Let me reply by giving you an example: We had expected that there would be certain prices for energy and that a certain amount of energy would be imported from the Czech Republic; this was reduced by approximately 20 percent. Imports were contracted from the Soviet Union at prices higher than in the West. This means a loss of several billion korunas for the Slovak Republic. I have to take these facts into consideration if price liberalization is to be respected. I have to bear in mind while managing this situation—which still exists on the state's part today—how I will carry this change over into the cost of energy and goods and what the subsequent reaction will be. Or I have to think in a different way—that it would be better for me to close down two or three factories and pay people to stay at home; which would be more tolerable? Someone has to regulate all of this! Today I received a letter from the director of the Dubnica nad Vahom enterprise in which he writes the following: "Dear Prime Minister, I am at the end of my rope; I am not good enough as a director. Help me. At the end of May I will have to close down the enterprise and 14,000 people will lose their jobs." During economic reform, the state simply cannot rely just on the market when that market does not yet exist.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] Mr. Meciar, we would like to turn your attention away from economic problems and toward political problems. In Martin you said: "We are going into a difficult battle, and our colleagues of

yesterday treat us worse than they treat communists and State Security members." Can you be more specific?

[Meciar] I am being punished for having a different view of the VPN program. They immediately made an enemy of me. Since my popularity among the public is great, it was necessary, at any price, to create the image of a different Meciar. This is how Meciar the enemy of society who is preparing a leftist coup and wants to hand Slovakia over to communists and to the Soviet Union came into being. This is how Meciar the dictator who is trying to undermine Central Europe's stability and who breaks up the common state was born. The people who have joined me are also given the ugliest labels....

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] Do you mean, for example, members of Obroda [Revival; club associating reform Communists expelled after 1969]?

[Meciar] I have never been a member of Obroda, but I cooperated with Prague in past years—with Docent Huebl, from whom I received a lot of good material. Previously, in fact, I was more oriented toward Prague than toward Slovakia. I had only partial information about Slovakia from Mr. Dubcek. All the rest is not true. For instance, they moved that I be recalled from the post of prime minister, yet there is no single piece of evidence that I was unfaithful to the program, that I disobeyed the law, or that I have misbehaved.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] You are being reproached for not having informed either the government or the Slovak National Council about your trips abroad. Deputy Prime Minister Kucerak claims that you were not speaking the truth when you said that Czech enterprises do not want to buy sheet metal from the East Slovak Iron Works....

[Meciar] The government apparently does not know that every official trip and its program is approved by the government Presidium. These trips are not presented to the Slovak National Council for approval. As far as the reports from foreign trips are concerned, the Ministry of International Relations evaluates them, prepares a report, and presents it to the government. If someone says that the government is not informed, then it is not true. As for Mr. Kucerak and the East Slovak Iron Works, I would like to follow up on what Dionyz Kundera, deputy general director from Kosice [Iron Works], said on the Czechoslovak Television Journal of 21 February 1991. He replied to Mlada Boleslav [automobile plant] that it is quite all right if the buyer behaves according to the market rules, yet the startling manner in which all this was done was unfavorable and detrimental to the East Slovak Iron Works. It is normal that Mlada Boleslav has found some other partner. When doing so, however, it was not necessary to slander the Iron Works by saying they are not capable of quality production. Deputy Prime Minister Kucerak, who is responsible for these matters, has shown once again that he is not well-informed.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] You say your political opponents often envy you your popularity. Do you think that you overestimate your popularity and that, for a politician, relations with his native party or movement are equally important?

[Meciar] What is a politician supposed to do if his movement deviates from its course? It is not true that I do not respect my movement; what I do not respect is the fact that this movement has deviated from its course. The majority of the population, that is, thousands of people, are backing the VPN that we have created. That is, I have never given up the VPN. I am staying under its banner, and I even think that it is precisely the group of people who have stayed with me that is desperately fighting for this movement's program. It is not by chance that all the ministers responsible for the economy stood up against two deputy prime ministers who want to carry out economic reform in a different way than we originally planned. Experience has shown me that popularity is extremely volatile. Yet, on the other hand, I cannot agree with Fedor Gal's statement that it is not important if we only have 3 percent of the population behind us. I cannot keep together a government that has the support of 3 percent of the population. The political movement must respect the fact that I am the prime minister in a coalition government and that, to retain the government's unity, I must also satisfy the Christian Democrats and the Democratic Party. If I do not do this, then I will break up the government. I have offered my function to the movement's chairman, Fedor Gal. If he said that he would take over the position of prime minister, I would resign the same day to leave my post to him.

Whoever comes after me will be first, less popular; and second, there are agreements that are linked to my person. Many people do not know about these agreements, because they are of a personal nature. Third, we are entering a bad period. Whoever heads the government during this bad period will have to face all the consequences. I suppose it will be possible to reduce them, but not to eliminate them. When someone else comes, before he learns his job, a great many people will have to pay for it. However, I do not suffer from a mania that I must head the government.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] When one listens to you, one quite often hears you speak about envy and attempts being made to remove you. Why do you believe this is so?

[Meciar] There is evidence in the form of witnesses' testimonies that says that the former Office for the Protection of Constitutional Officials and some functionaries tried to discredit me as a collaborator of the former State Security or, alternatively, of the KGB. They worked on this task since June of last year, then there was a break for some time, and then these structures became active again. I have witnesses' testimonies about it, and I intend to present them to the legislature. Moreover, members of my family drew my attention to the fact—and I myself have noticed it, too—that cars

that seemed suspicious to us were following us. We agreed that we would mark down [the license number of] one of these cars, and we found it was a car belonging to the Ministry of Interior's surveillance service. This car—they claimed—was supposed to find out where I live but, for God's sake, my place of residence is not a secret! In this connection, it is not without interest that I have received a few notices that I should restrict my personal movements and that criminal proceedings have been initiated against persons who wanted to assassinate me. This information is repeating itself over and over again, even the names of the alleged assassins. One is Slovak and the other one is Czech, that is, it is not a Czech affair, as some thought it was. Moreover, I can document that whenever I was on a trip, some people who did not belong to the press were constantly present, and they made exact notes of what I was saying. I have no reason to hide anything, but I abhor these methods.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] Let us return to the situation in Slovak National Uprising Square on 14 March, when Vaclav Havel was attacked. We were intrigued by slogans reported by reporters such as "Long live Tiso" and "Only Hitler can teach the Czechs, these Jewish pigs, a lesson," etc. I believe it is not important now how many people were there, but the fact is important that these slogans were voiced there and that, in our opinion, you, as prime minister, should have vigorously distanced yourself from such slogans. Why have you not done this?

[Meciar] My first reaction after I returned from abroad was to call on the prosecutor general to make criminally liable all those who violated the law at the aforementioned demonstration. What more can I do, as prime minister, than to demand that they be prosecuted and that a special investigative commission be established? There is only one possibility left—to go to the streets and slap the faces of those people. No one can ask that from me.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] You should distance yourself from these people. So far, you have only expressed regret over this incident, but, in our opinion, it is necessary to say quite loudly that you condemn these fascist tendencies, which are unique in Europe today....

[Meciar] There was a Tiso plaque in Banovce and Bebravou. Who was the first, and the only one at that time, to have publicly spoken out against and to have publicly attacked fascists? Meciar. Or, let us take [the rally marking the anniversary of prewar politician Andrej Hlinka held in August 1990 in] Ruzomberok, for example, where the situation was dangerous and could have developed in all kinds of ways.... Who was the first and the only one to speak out? Meciar. Why do I have to constantly prove that I am not a fascist?

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] You criticize your opponents very often. Could you, for a change, criticize yourself? What mistakes have you made?

[Meciar] My first mistake was that I accepted this position. I made a second mistake when I agreed that the minister of the interior does not have to be from our movement, in defiance of a previous agreement that he should. The third mistake was that I did not influence the selection of members of the government and that I accepted them as they were presented to me. The fourth mistake was that I agreed that decisions on personnel positions, including the position of deputy prime ministers, would be made somewhere else and that I would have no political influence on them. The fifth mistake was that I reduced the number of employees from 150 to 17. Having done so, I am exceptionally overburdened, etc., etc. We made a certain mistake when we were establishing bodies of local administration. Because I did not have enough time, I opted for a compromise that I know is not good.... and I could continue.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] Is there a limit beyond which you would consider establishing an independent Slovak state?

[Meciar] No, only Czechs can force us to establish the Slovak state, and not even Czechs can because the rank and file citizens do not want it—only the Czech politicians can. If the question is formulated as either a functional federation or an independent state, then I have to ask: What is a functional federation? Who will define it? Is it identical to Mr. President's current concept of the federation? After all, in many respects his concept gives fewer powers than [granted to Slovakia] in 1979 [year as published].

VPN Council Statement on Recent Session

LD0804174791 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 1000 GMT 8 Apr 91

["Text" of statement issued by the Organizational Committee of the Public Against Violence (VPN) platform For Democratic Slovakia (ZDS) at a session of the VPN Slovak Council held in Trencianske Teplice on 5 April]

[Text] The current VPN leadership has drawn up a scenario for the VPN Council. Authorized delegates to the Council, members of the platform For Democratic Slovakia, had no chance to get acquainted with this document. A procedure well known from a not-so-distant period was repeated once again. The opponents of the platform allocated for themselves in the Council's agenda time for long contributions to the debate, the content of which was not to seek ways out from the VPN crisis, but to level stereotyped accusations at the platform and its representatives. Attacks were also leveled at the prime minister, but he was absent. On behalf of the platform, Michal Kovac, Slovak minister of finance, prices and wages, proposed setting up a working commission that would quickly suggest ways to tackle the crisis. He also proposed electing a republican assembly attended by the delegates from districts nominated by districts on a just basis and according to the proportion of support gained by the new platform in a particular district council.

Fedor Gal conveyed his demand that, before the talks on solving the dispute open, representatives of the platform should apologize and retract some of their claims. Juraj Flamik delivered a one-sided assessment of the rise and course of action of the platform For Democratic Slovakia. This evoked a protest from Augustin Marian Huska, Slovak minister of the administration and privatization of national property, in which he said among other things that Juraj Flamik's assessment was a confrontational one. We reject this course of action. Not only does the Council's scenario put us in the dock, it puts us in the dock of those who were sentenced beforehand. I am afraid that its objective is to expel us from the movement and, above all, to get hold of the VPN title and assets, which came into being first and foremost thanks to the result of election.

In effect, Mr. Minister Huska pointed to what is hidden behind the stance of current leadership. It is an attempt to virtually disown the new platform. This threat is real despite the fact that the votes and thus the funds were not gained for the VPN by those residing in Jiraskova street [VPN headquarters] today. The point is that the VPN charter contains so-called circuit-breaking mechanisms, which effectively prevent endangering the center by voices from below. If districts disagree on a particular question with the center, they are able, according to the charter, to ask for convening an extraordinary assembly. However, the order of procedures adopted at the Topolcany congress stipulates that only these same delegates who attended the last congress are able to attend this extraordinary assembly. Therefore, if a district changes its view of a certain problem, and if it wishes to be represented by other delegates, it has no right to nominate them to the extraordinary assembly.

Restrictions imposed on inner democracy in the VPN date back to the September congress, when delegates from the districts were even completely excluded from political decisionmaking. It should therefore be said that this circuit-breaking mechanism aimed against the stances of the districts precisely carries the spirit of centralist policy of VPN leadership. This was precisely one of the reasons that gave rise to the platform For Democratic Slovakia, which demands, among other things, renewal of inner democracy in the VPN.

It appears that the current VPN leadership is resolved to use the power in its hands to eliminate the VPN platform For Democratic Slovakia. This was most directly expressed by Slovak National Council Chairman Frantisek Miklosko when speaking to the public in the course of the VPN session in Treancianske Teplice: We shall convene an extraordinary assembly where we shall split ourselves, but we shall not give you any funds, he said.

In conclusion, let us quote again from the speech of Minister Augustin Marian Huska. If you consider us a minority splinter group, then I must point out the following to you: The appreciation of democracy by a majority is given by its attitude toward a minority. The democratic mechanism loses its purpose if it betrays its spiritual meaning, which is tolerance and service. District assemblies of the VPN will be taking place in the near future. Even if they change their views of their delegates in any way, they may not send others to the extraordinary assembly. They have the possibility, however, of insisting that their delegates vote in the assembly in the spirit that gains the majority at the district assembly in democratic discussion between both streams within the VPN.

The attitude of the For Democratic Slovakia platform to the division of the VPN will be proposed at Wednesday's meeting between representatives of the districts who align themselves with the platform, its spokesman and the Organization Committee, the organizational committee of the platform.

Slovak Company Applies for License To Sell Tanks

AU0904142991 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 29 Mar 91 pp 1, 2

[Rostislav Valasek article: "Where and to Whom, Will Tanks From Martin Be Sold?"]

[Excerpts] Prague— A recently established limited liability company by the name of Unimpex, based in Martin, applied to the Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade for a license to sell arms in mid-March.

Until now, the Omnipol foreign trade enterprise has had a monopoly on trade in arms in Czechoslovakia. [passage omitted]

Engineer Jindrich Lacko, press spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Trade, confirmed that the ministry had received the application from Unimpex and that it will be considered. There appears to be no reason to deny to Unimpex the license, despite the fact that—according to Engineer Alois Soupal, press spokesman for Omnipol—our monopoly exporter of arms to date has T-72 tanks "in stock" for which it has no buyer. [passage omitted]

Engineer Milan Warecha, the director of Unimpex, admitted in reply to our question that, should the production of tanks be resumed in Martin, the company is ready, once it is awarded the license to engage in foreign trade activity, to mediate the sale of these tanks abroad. It would, naturally, comply with existing legislation, whereby an organization engaged in this type of trade is issued a license for trade transactions on the basis of a collective decision by representatives of the Federal Ministries of Foreign Trade, Interior, Defense, and Foreign Affairs. The condition is that the place of destination must be known so the weapons are not exported to areas of crisis. [passage omitted] If tanks begin to be produced in Martin, then T-72s will go out into the world once again. The question is where and to whom.

Slovakia's Carnogursky on Media, Political Issues

LD0904213691 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 1000 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Interview with Jan Carnogursky, Slovak first deputy prime minister, by unidentified reporter in Bratislava; date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] After some time, the government of the Slovak Republic is in session in Bratislava today as usual. It is not altogether usual that on the agenda, among other things, is a report on the fulfillment of the program statement, and the bill on the radio.

[Reporter] It is definitely not usual for the government to evaluate the report on the fulfillment of the program statement. There could be two reasons First, that the government has finally listened to many calls by some deputies of the Slovak National Council [SNR] to come before the Federal Assembly and give an account of its work; and second, that the presidium of the SNR could make use of this report for recalling Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, or leaving him in his post. First Deputy Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky has left the session for a moment to come to the microphone so I am asking him—Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, which one of these hypotheses is the closest to reality?

[Carnogursky] I am not here to concern myself with hypotheses. So far, the government is discussing the text of the report on the fulfillment of the program statement that has been presented. I would like to assure you that it is normal for the government to come before the SNR with a report on the fulfillment of its program statement, except that this generally takes place after about a year or two of the activity of the government. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] The one point on the agenda that has been dealt with so far is the approved draft bill on the Slovak radio and television. Can you briefly tell us about the new things in it, compared with the present law?

[Carnogursky] Yes, the government could finally concern itself with the draft bills on radio and television. The government approved the draft bills. The new element will be that radio and television cease to be state institutions and they will both become so-called public legal institutions. This means that they will continue to receive support from the state, and they will be managed by a committee in which the state will have a minority. The state will be easily outvoted. As far as the specific provisions are concerned, the decisive body that will manage the activity of radio and television will be a council, a radio council and a television council. This council will be composed of 17 members. This is a change from the original proposal, which was considering 33 members. It will be 17 members, seven of whom will be appointed by the presidium of the SNR, three will be appointed by the government, three will be appointed by the so-called consultative council—that is, a body made up of representatives of both non-parliamentary political parties, churches, social organizations, trade unions and so on,—and four will be appointed by the radio or television. This council will then propose the director of radio or television, and the presidium of the SNR appoints him, but it can only appoint someone who has been proposed by the council.

[Reporter] [passage omitted] Yesterday information became public about your secret talks with Mr. Frantisek Miklosko on the one side and the Czech representation on the other, which was represented by Mrs. Buresova and Mr Pithart. Mr Miklosko was not very forthcoming yesterday, what about you today?

[Carnogursky] I am afraid I will disappoint you, not by being unforthcoming, but it was an informal meeting on a friendly basis. [passage omitted] It was an unofficial meeting, and I would describe the debate as an historical philosophical one rather than a legal one.

[Reporter] I would like to ask you about the cancelled meeting between the president and the Slovak political representatives. At first sight, it would appear that it did not take place because you were on an official trip, and on the other hand it can be said that Fedor Gal later expressed the view that the time was not in fact right for such a political meeting. I would like to ask why the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] assumed that this meeting did not take place because of your absence. Are you really so irreplaceable?

[Carnogurksy] I am very sorry that the blame now lies with the KDH. The fact is that my visit to our compatriots in Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia had been agreed long before. [passage omitted] I hope that nothing tragic has happened, and that the meeting will take place.

[Reporter] Do you agree with the view expressed by Mr. Gal that this meeting would be premature?

[Carnogursky] I think not, because every meeting can serve at least for the clarification of one's own position, if not for actual progress. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] I would like to return to the meeting with Mrs. Buresova. Did you speak about the Constitution? Was the state in agreement on the agenda?

[Carnogursky] Yes, we spoke about the state agreement. [passage omitted] I would say that the position of our partners at the meeting was more flexible than they, in particular Mrs. Buresova, presented in the media. [passage omitted]

FIDESZ, SZDSZ, MDF on Six-Party Talks

AU1004073291 Budapest 168 ORA in Hungarian 2 Apr 91 pp 4-5

[Interview with Viktor Orban, Ivan Peto, and Imre Furmann, by Ferenc Vicsek; place and date not given: "The Art of Compromises—Six Parties in Search of a Way Out"—first paragraph is 168 ORA introduction]

[Excerpts] As is well known, the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] came out with an unexpected proposal to solve the political paralysis: The FIDESZ invited the representatives of the six parliamentary parties to the negotiating table to come to an agreement on how to solve the most urgent political and economic problems. Analysts are already pondering whether this is an initiative aimed at rescuing the country, or a six-member merry-go-round. Our reporter interviewed Viktor Orban of the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ], Ivan Petho of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ], and Imre Furmann of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF].

[Vicsek] Why is the opposition currently accepting most of the government responsibilities?

[Orban] We do not intend to take over the role of the National Assembly. We do not have to work out specific norms here, but we must try to achieve the broadest possible political consensus needed for the major political and economic laws. It could also happen that we would come to an agreement on the basic principles, but we will have very big debates on details in the parliamentary plenum later. If various views appear within the basic principles, I will not consider this as an infringement of the agreement. As for taking over some government responsibilities, it is true that the FIDESZ-proposal contains some points that initiate negotiations on matters that are in the jurisdiction of the government, rather than on legislative matters. I do not know how the government will react to this and whether the government will be ready to take all this into consideration at all. Nor do I know whether the other two opposition parties are also willing to accept such responsibilities. [passage omitted]

[Vicsek] After all, the FIDESZ-proposal legitimizes the political situation that other political forces said was not stable at all. Will this proposal stabilize the situation?

[Orban] There is truth in all this, but I think that last year's elections, rather than the FIDESZ-proposal or such negotiations, were the ones that legitimized this political situation. Your question also shows that it is rather difficult to interpret all that was said at the SZDSZ congress. I do not understand too well what they meant, either. I do understand that the SZDSZ became tough, but nobody wrote anything about what it means in practice that the SZDSZ changed from an opposition force into an enemy of the government or how the opposition should replace the government. [passage omitted]

[Vicsek] In the wake of this FIDESZ-proposal, it seems that the MDF and the government are now closer to the FIDESZ than the two other members of the opposition. Why?

[Petho] The problem that FIDESZ wants to solve with its proposal exists, and we all know about it. The quick government reaction also shows that there is some kind of stalemate here. One can sense certain dangers inherent in the government's inability to function, and consequently, in the ineffectiveness of the National Assembly. Many things are unclear. We see three major problems that Hungary must overcome. The first is a general problem, no matter who is leading the country: The existing and expected social tensions in Hungary must obviously be tackled by all the political parties, irrespective of whether they are government or opposition parties. In fact, the MDF-SZDSZ pact also emerged as a result of a similar conclusion.

Another problem is the inability of the National Assembly and of the government to function. The way we see it, this government in a sense acts as a government, but it does not function as a coalition government should function in a multiparty system. [passage omitted]

The third problem is that there are indeed institutional problems in Hungary, problems that do not belong to the tasks of a given government, but which are long-term tasks. Thus, we must set up adequate institutions capable of tackling these problems. This also justifies multiparty negotiations. [passage omitted]

[Vicsek] Will MDF policy change at all, now that it is striving for such cooperation with the opposition within the National Assembly, naturally by preserving the current political structure?

[Furmann] I think that we are talking here about a real qualitative change, but everyone who knows MDF policy from within can see that, almost from the very beginning, we have been trying to open up, because we can only represent true democracy by creating party democracy. The fact that, naturally, there have always been debates within the party also shows our readiness for continuous renewal. [passage omitted]

In this context, in my opinion, this is an opposition proposal that we should not disregard. [passage omitted]

MDF on Political Situation, Government Activity

AU1004091591 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 6 Apr 91 p 7

[Interview with Imre Konya, head of the faction of the Hungarian Democratic Forum in the National Assembly, by Dezso Pinter; place and date not given: "Extraordinary Elections Would Be Everyone's Failure"—first paragraph is MAGYAR HIRLAP introduction]

[Excerpts] Imre Konya has never considered the idea of some sort of professional or national unity government, and he even regards this as a nightmare. According to the head of the faction of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] "one who thinks that the current disillusionment and dissatisfaction are signs of increasing confidence in a political power other than the majority power, a power that could mobilize most of our society, is making a grave mistake." Imre Konya rejects the idea that the Justitia-plan is equivalent to a showdown, and he does not think it is desirable for the various social groups to feel persecuted. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] It is still difficult to explain the often repeated conclusion that the MDF parliamentary faction could in no way continue its activity in the previous manner. Specifically, what changes are we talking about?

[Konya] We are still working on setting up a new direction, and this is a problem not only for the activity of the MDF faction and of the National Assembly in general, but also for the activity of all the new institutions. As for the essence of the aforementioned changes, we want to develop new organizational forms that could contribute to a better use of the intellectual capital and energy available in our faction. We are trying to make sure that the government proposals include the ideas of our parliamentary deputies, and that the modifying proposals are the result of a joint activity.

[Pinter] Political analyses often claim that the MDF faction, as well as the MDF itself, do not have individual features, and that representatives of differing views are forced to make bad compromises. In your view, what kind of platforms will emerge within your faction?

[Konya] There are a few deputies who would agree with the emergence of platforms along the ideological trends currently prevailing in the MDF faction; however, most of the deputies do not demand this. The reason for this is probably the fact that the national views, the national liberal views, and the Christian-democratic commitment are all present in most of our deputies, and these views do not contradict each other. Of course, there are people who feel that one or the other ideological commitment is stronger for them. In any case, you are mistaken if you think that the lack of platforms is causing tension in our faction. [passage ommitted]

[Pinter] As early as February, Prime Minister Jozsef Antall told MAGYAR HIRLAP that "there is no 'never' or 'always' either in politics or love." This government coalition has already lived through several big crises, but the composition of your party has not changed so far. I know that you are one of those who stick to the current government composition. What must happen to change your position?

[Konya] I stick to stability. Although we have considerable intellectual and financial resources, we are unable to restructure our economy without foreign capital. Foreign capital, however, does not flow into a politically unstable country. The parties that are participating in the current coalition are ideologically close to each other, and I really mean here the parties themselves, and not the specific manifestations of individual deputies. A coalition made up of other parties would represent a change that could threaten our stability. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] Could a situation emerge in Hungary that would make extraordinary elections inevitable?

[Konya] This would not be desirable at all. If we hold annual elections, this is almost as if we never held elections. A lot of energy and time would be wasted, and we would not be able to deal with economic restructuring and legislation. Everyone would concentrate on political struggle. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] Many people fear that the gradual lack of confidence in the National Assembly could lead to political destabilization. Do you sense this danger?

[Konya] Of course. The governing parties, the opposition, and the mass media can all be blamed for our society's losing confidence in its Parliament. We drew the necessary conclusions by deciding to change our faction's activity; however, there are expectations that we cannot fulfill. Our society wants to simultaneously experience democracy and also a firm power. One can often hear the following: "Tell us what to do." This is not the way democracy works. Democracy relies on the people's ingenuity and readiness to act, and this is much more difficult than fulfilling orders from above. [passage omitted]

Defense Minister Interviewed on Military Policy

LD0904125191 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1945 GMT 8 Apr 91

[Discussion forum with Defense Minister Lajos Fur and Ferenc Kosa, Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) deputy to the National Assembly, in the presence of an audience; presented by unidentified moderator; in Fertod on 6 April—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Moderator] Can soldiers engage in political activity? Who commands the Army? In which direction is the Hungarian Army going after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? Which is the more feasible path, neutrality or independence? This is what the citizens of Fertod and its surroundings asked Defense Minister Lajos Fur and Ferenc Kosa, HSP deputy to the National Assembly, on Saturday last. In the following 45 minutes, you will see a compilation from the debate. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified member of the audience] Mr. Minister: I do not know whether you heard the Thurmerite statement on the TV2 program of 3 April, which was delivered at their ceremony and highlighted by the reporter [Thurmer is the chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (MSZMP)] that they wish to replenish the party from workers, public employees, and the Army, and they rely on their support. Please, if we want a national Army that is free of politics, if I were defense

minister I would ban a member of any party from being a member of the Army. [passage omitted]

[Moderator] I do not know whether Mr. Defense Minister has the right to ban such a thing, according to the current Constitution.

[Fur] I do not have the right, since, more broadly, this is an issue touching on individual, human rights. For this reason, the defense minister, even the commander of the Army, cannot decide alone in this matter. Rather, an important parliamentary decision must be made here.

My opinion, however, which more or less agrees with the opinion of the majority of the professional staff of the Hungarian Army, is that there can be no place within the Army for party political battles. As a consequence, neither can there be place for politicizing. Put bluntly, it would be ideal if a decision could be made to banish party politics from the Army's internal life. There should be no kind of party. The Army, in spirit and in character, must be a supraparty body. There is one sole thing to which it can be committed, and this is the Republic of Hungary as well as to the cause of the nation.

[Moderator] The question of who issues commands to the Army has recently been a subject of discussion in public opinion. We have also heard that the defense minister might perhaps request an amendment of the Defense Law, or an amendment to the Constitution in this connection.

[Fur] It is not a question of an amendment. At the moment, there are various law and constitutional provisions, and there are problems concerning their interpretation. One side explains them one way, the other side explains them differently, and the third side interprets them differently again. So there are differnces of view here within legislation and especially within the application of legislation, which must be clarified. The clarification of these pertains, in part, to the National Assembly, by means of enacting a law or by means of a constitutional measure or provision, which makes up for these gaps. Not least, perhaps, the position or decision of the Constitutional Court itself might perhaps become necessary in certain issues.

[Moderator] If you were president of the Republic—because we know that you were considered, and had a good chance—would your opinion still be the same on the question that was asked?

[Fur] My opinion would be the same. It is obviously not a matter of anyone from among the three mentioned institutions, organizations, or personalities, casting a doubt on the other's right. I would like to point out again that there are certain differences regarding the application of the law. The explanations here differ, and these really must be sorted out, no matter from where, from which side, we view this matter.

[Unidentified member of audience] The Warsaw Pact's military structure has ceased to exist, and in this connection I have two questions. One is that in this manner, we been able to make savings for the military budget. Has the military reckoned with there being savings and where have the savings gone? The other question: has the Army's organization changed with this?

[Fur] What savings can the Hungarian Army make? Virtually nothing, directly, because the Warsaw Pact organization, the military organization, required a minimal contribution from Hungary, just like from the other member countries.

To be precise, there was a joint armed forces staff in Moscow, and it was necessary to contribute certain sums annually for the maintenance and operation of this staff. These were not large sums. This staff had to be maintained, they had buildings that had to be financed and operated. Apart from this, Hungary, in proportion to its size, took part in this joint armed forces staff to the tune of some 15-20 officers, and obviously it was necessary to ensure their presence in Moscow—operations, pay, etc. Apart from this, there were certain military exercises in the previous years, joint military exercises, which required special outlays. These were the direct costs of the Warsaw Pact military organization.

There was another, more indirect role in the life of the Hungarian Army. I would not like to go into detail now about how the Hungarian Army fit into the military system of the entire Warsaw Pact, and what its role was, the extent to which this role made the Hungarian Army larger than necessary, the extent to which its weaponry was different to what it will have to be now when it performs its tasks not articulated in the Warsaw system. [passage omitted]

Costs of a different type might arise here now, and considerably larger costs can be saved. To give an example: The Hunagrian Army numbered 155,000 in 1989, and we wish to reduce these now to some 90,000 by the end of 1992 or early 1993. Well, there is an enormous difference between the two. Obviously, considerable savings will be made as a result of this.

[Moderator] The questioner also asked what legacy did the four decades of the Warsaw Pact leave us with, regarding the extent to which the structure differs from the structure of armies in countries not belonging to the Warsaw Pact; or are they identical?

[Fur] Well, it left us a legacy in several regards, in connection with the structure, too. One is its leadership—this is what there was debate over in recent days, it is an obvious question. Leadership and control operated in accordance with the appropriate set-up, that within the framework of the Warsaw system the leadership of the Hungarian Army was foreseen not only within the borders, but also outside the borders, primarily in the Western European region. As a consequence, in the previous structure of the Hungarian Army, it was necessary to ensure a greater scope for maintenance,

enforcement, servicing of military units, because this Army would have been deployed outside the country's borders in the event of possible war, and its organization had to be developed accordingly.

It is also very important that its leadership, as a consequence of this, was much larger than required by an army that performs solely defensive functions. I have also spoken about the numbers. As a consequence, the entire Warsaw Pact system left us with a rather large leadership staff. By way of example, allow me to say—these staff numbers are not military secrets—the general staff and the Army's command together amounted to nearly 1,100 people. In the course of the new reorganization, when the Army's staff numbers are decreasing by 50 percent, when beyond this there is no question of the former concept of military operations in which in serious circumstances the Hungarian Army would be deployed outside the country's borders, and when it can perform solely defensive functions, it is obvious that the leadership staff themselves can be considerably reduced. To be precise, they should be reduced.

[Unidentified member of the audience] I have a question for Deputy Kosa. [passage omitted] The government has some plans to sign separate agreements with the former socialist countries. Will the socialists take these treaties seriously? We know we cannot defend ourselves military from any socialist country.

[Kosa] We are indeed standing at a curious historical moment. [passage omitted] My personal view—and I am not alone in this, many agree—and to be quite straightforward about this, the only possibility for preserving Hungary is for Hungary to become neutral. [passage omitted] This idea should be considered by the whole of society and in the National Assembly. We should reach a national consensus, a full national agreement on this. If there is a need for a referendum on any question, then in my view this is one such question. [passage omitted]

[Moderator] Although the question was addressed to Ferenc Kosa, I must ask the views of Mr. Minister as well.

[Fur] I would have wanted to speak in any case, not as if I did not agree with much of what Ferenc Kosa has been saying, but in places I feel it is too beautiful a dream, which does not correspond to the present European realities in all aspects. After the end of the Warsaw Pact, not only Hungary got into a special situation in Europe, but so did Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. Quite obviously, if one of them could gain neutral status in a given world situation then the other four would ask, demand, the same for themselves.

One part of Europe would consist of neutral states, and there would be another half; this is not the direction in which Europe would like to progress. The Western and Central European countries equally are talking about a form of European unity, a unified Europe, a European security system in which every European country wants to be a member, a member with equal rights. All these things seem to speak against it even in this very difficult and risky situation in which not only Hungary but Czechoslovakia and the other countries also find themselves.

Many are asking what the classification of Hungary in this new situation will be. NATO member? No. Nonaligned? No. Neutral? No. An independent, free country, but with all the responsibilities, with all the pressing responsibilities, because we must preserve this. The path to this could be neutral status, if this is the direction toward which the world is moving, if indeed such very substantial differences and conflicts have developed between the remaining eastern part of Europe—that is, the Soviet Union and the western region. The aims go in a different direction, however, so it is very difficult to find a security system during this transitional period that can guarantee the security of these countries. As is well known, we are trying to conclude bilateral agreements to achieve this aim, first of all with all our neighbors. We are trying to do this so no one is be threatened by neighbors, and there are no suspicions. That is why we are trying, for example, to sign bilateral military treaties with everyone, with Austria as well as with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia. [passage omitted]

[Kosa] I think there is no difference in substance between what Lajos Fur is saying and what I have said. A new structure can indeed develop, a new unprecedented form of European security, and we have to think realistically. If this is the long-term strategic aim then for the period of transition how can the security of Hungary be ensured? I do not exclude the even better possibility at some stage of a Central European or even a pan-European united system of states, which legally and naturally guarantees the peace of the whole of the continent, between the nations and between the continents and super-powers. [passage omitted]

[Indistinct question on updating military hardware]

[Fur] Our aim for the future is that Hungarian military techniques and equipment should rest on three pillars. There should remain an eastern part regarding certain weapons. The second pillar should be based on home produced equipment, and the third should be based on Western European industry or its products. To promote the last two, we would, however, need very large amounts of money, because this equipment costs a lot more than that imported from the Soviet Union, and at present, unfortunately, the Hungarian Army is at the stage when even the replacement of parts frequently causes serious problems. It is vital that the financial resources of the country should increase as well as the budget allocation for the army to procure this equipment. There is some way to go yet. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified member of audience] There has been mention several times of the economic and financial negotiations between the Soviet and Hungarian governments, in connection with the temporary stationing here

and withdrawal of Soviet troops. I would like to ask Mr. Minister and Mr. Deputy what you, personally, expect of the negotiations, and in your view what the final results of the negotiations will be.

[Fur] It is contingent on the process of negotiations. Put bluntly, how far are the sides willing to go in their readiness to reach a compromise? This is a matter of bargaining, where after the elimination of the various items, the question of whether a mutually acceptable compromise for both sides can come about will depend on the course of the negotiations. A sum cannot be stated, because would we state a sum in vain. The most various sums are being tossed about. We are far from giving a final result. I trust, I am told by the competent experts that we can trust, that perhaps some sort of compromise solution will come about in the course of April, in May at the latest. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified member of audience] Will the government hold a public festival when the Russians withdraw?

[Fur] Not the government, because on its own the government cannot stage a public festivity. At the most it could decree one. It is not certain that the people would want this. To speak seriously, I would like to hand a bouquet of flowers to the last Soviet soldier who leaves Hungary. [passage omitted]

After the final separation we really must begin to form a relationship that is very normal and is very good-neighborly on every plane of life, because this simply will be a question of vital importance for Hungary as well as for the European region where we are located, no matter how internal political matters develop in the Soviet Union in the future. I would very much like, and request that everyone here, as well as the entire country, through television, should mentally accept that the country has ended up in a radically different situation, as from 1 April, and it will end up so on 30 June. This new situation requires a completely new attitude from every sincle citizen, in their thinking, vis-a-vis the cause of the homeland and the country. Because this requires a new and different kind of attitude vis-a-vis the cause of the country which has become free and independent, it is necessary to think over the fact that a completely different attitude is necessary in our way of thinking vis-a-vis the Army whose mission is to defend the country's borders, which has taken an oath for its protection. Believe me: In the final analysis, there is not and will not be any guarantee for the country to defend itself other than the Hungarian Army. As defense minister, I trust that there will be no permanent need for the force of weapons in Europe, but as long as they are needed they must be accorded the appropriate esteem not only by those who handle them, but also by the entire nation in whose interest the person concerned bears the weapons. [passage omitted]

POFOSZ Members Employed at Security Office

AU1004094291 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 6 Apr 91 p 5

[Interview with Andras Galszecsy, minister without portfolio in charge of the National Security Office, by unidentified reporter; place and date not given: "The Members of National Association of Former Political Prisoners Do Not Read the List of Agents—The Right To Decide Rests With the Committee"—first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Text] The publication of the news of the National Association of Former Political Prisoners [POFOSZ] delegating experts to the National Security Office was received with sharp criticism within opposition circles. This was the topic of our conversation with Andras Galszecsy.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Well, are the people sent to these offices inspectors or employees? Can they look into your operational affairs and into the lists of your agents or not?

[Galszecsy] They are not inspectors, they cannot look into our lists of agents, and cannot deal with our operational issues. They are civilian employees with contracts, who work as advisors to the acting general director, his deputy, the managing director, and at some posts in the country.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Was this structure initiated by you as a minister, or by POFOSZ?

[Galszecsy] I do not know who initiated it. I was not a minister then. At any rate, I agreed with the idea, and I informed the National Security Office in my capacity as a chief government advisor about it. Nobody said we should not do it then. You can check the minutes.

[NEPSZABADSAG] How was the new structure received by th. staff?

[Galszecsy] At first they received it with serious reservations. They realized gradually: bringing in experts who know what it is like to be on the opposite side can only improve the reputation of an office like ours, which was not very good before.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What would you do if the Parliamentary Committee for National Security decided that there was no need for this type of social reinforcement?

[Galszecsy] We would terminate the contracts.

Smallholders' Party Faction Leader Elected

LD0904180391 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1600 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] The National Assembly press office gave us the news that Gyula Pasztor was the winner in the second round of voting for the post of faction leader of the Smallholders' Party. The vote was 23 to 21. Jozsef Torgyan, the dismissed faction leader, thus received 21 votes.

Former Secret Service Leaders on Trial

LD0904224591 Budapest MTI in English 1819 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] Budapest, April 9 (MTI)—The trial of Ferenc Pallagi, former deputy minister of internal affairs in charge of state security, and Jozsef Horvath, former head of the ministry's secret service, began in the Budapest military court on Tuesday.

Both are accused of having continued the secret monitoring of the leaders of the opposition parties, even after the proclamation of the Republic of Hungary on October 23, 1989, and of passing on the data to non-competent persons, such as some of the leaders of the Hungarian Socialist Party. Pallagi is also accused of having given an order for the destruction of various secret documents.

Soviets Reject Arrangements for Bilateral Trade

LD0904143791 Budapest MTI in English 1147 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] Budapest, April 9, 1991 (MTI-ECONEWS)—The Hungarian Ministry of International Economic Relations does not hold out much hope that the Soviet Union will accept the Hungarian proposal that the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD] grant U.S. $500 million each to Hungary and the Soviet Union and hold clearing accounts for them to finance bilateral trade. The idea was first aired by Hungarian Finance Minister Mihaly Kupa during his recent visit to Moscow. If trade between Hungary and the Soviet Union does not move out of its present stalemate, several Hungarian companies heavily dependent on the Soviet market will be forced to cut back production drastically and lay off large numbers of staff.

Janos Martonyi, state secretary in the Mier, today told ECONEWS that, in his opinion, the Soviet Union will not accept the scheme because it has never agreed with any clearing-system-based trade financing method. The Soviet Union intends to use only a quarter of its export income to finance imports. The remainder of its dollar income will be mainly used to repay its debts. The Soviet Union exports mainly crude oil, gas and other raw materials to the East European countries and these countries will continue to buy these commodities even if their exports to the Soviet Union shrink to a minimum.

Several Hungarian delegations have tried to gain Soviet acceptance for some form of credit arrangement to settle trade bills but their proposals have been consistently rejected. The Soviet Union now has until April 15 to respond to the Hungarian proposal that bilateral trade be financed with the help of EBRD loans.

Economist's Views on Trade With USSR Noted

LD0904164891 Budapest MTI in English 1105 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] Budapest, April 9, 1991 (MTI-ECONEWS)—It has become clear that Hungarian-Soviet trade can no longer be carried out through inter-government agreements, Laszlo Lengyel, director of the Hungarian Financial Research PLC, told today's edition of the economic daily VILAGGAZDASAG.

Mr Lengyel, who was a member of the delegation, headed by Finance Minister Mihaly Kupa, which recently visited Moscow, also said that Hungary cannot hope for rapid repayment of the Soviet debt.

Mr Lengyel said that at the talks the Hungarian delegation attempted to discuss separately three fundamental problems: bilateral trade, the settlement of the Soviet debt and the financial aspects of the Soviet troop withdrawals.

The talks confirmed the view that agreements made at government level are no guarantee that trade will function at company level, Mr Lengyel said. He added that, in order to conduct business in the Soviet Union, talks at federal, republic, regional and company level are necessary but that these contacts are severely hampered by Soviet central government policy.

Furthermore, strict foreign exchange and foreign trade controls are in force and there are said to be plans to mark banknotes so that the republic in which they are put into circulation can be easily traced. Despite these difficulties, Mr Legyel feels that it is necessary to maintain regular contact, possibly through weekly meetings, with the Soviet authorities in order to provide a political umbrella, for communication at lower levels.

It is vital that Hungarian companies remain a presence on the Soviet market, he said. He added, however, that it is important that they realize that the era of huge orders has passed and companies will have to make extra efforts to secure even small deals.

Mr Lengyel termed the fact that they managed to convince their negotiating partners that the Soviet market is important for Hungary as the most important achievement of the talks.

Little progress was made at the Moscow talks on the question of methods of payment.

The proposal that Hungary and the Soviet Union have a clearing account at the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, with an initial sum of $500-500 million coming from an EBRD loan, attracted some Soviet interest but nothing definite was agreed. The parties have until April 15 to state whether they wish this arrangement or not, Mr Lengyel said.

The final accounts may show a Soviet debt to Hungary of as much as $2 billion. It was suggested at the latest talks that the Soviet Union pay the sum over 3-3.5 years.

Earlier, Hungary wanted the Soviet Union to settle the whole sum in 1991, while the Soviets wanted to spread payment over five years.

Given the present state of the Soviet economy however, Mr Lengyel does not hold out much hope that the Soviet Union can pay the debt in five, far less three years. He suggests that Hungary instead tries to convert the debt into equity in Soviet companies. This solution does not promise huge profits in the short term but it would give Hungary a valuable foothold in the sub-Carpathian market and in the Soviet oil fields. It would also be a useful experiment for Hungarian capital investment abroad.

In connection with Soviet troop withdrawals from Hungary, Mr Lengyel expressed the personal view that the Hungarian Government might possibly agree to having the true value of the military facilities built by the Soviets in Hungary put down against the Soviet debt if this would promote balanced trade between the two countries.

Economics Official on EC Association Talks

LD0904212491 Budapest MTI in English 1520 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] Budapest, April 9 (MTI)—Hungary does not aim for the talks on the EC association agreement to be concluded in the first half of the year. Endre Juhasz, head of department at the Ministry of International Economic Relations and head of the Hungarian delegation, told MTI's correspondent, reflecting to the Monday statement of the current EC president that the difficulties which had emerged at the talks raised doubts whether the talks can be brought to a successful conclusion as early as the first half of the year, and added that the dicussions might be considerably drawn out.

Endre Juhasz stressed it would be optimal to reach agreement on the most important issues by the end of July, when the EC offices are closing for summer, but the main point is that the agreement come into force on January 1, 1992.

According to the latest statement of current EC President Jacques Santer, prime minister of Luxembourg, the agenda of the current talks does not include the Hungarian intention of eventually becoming a fully-fledged member of the economic communities.

On this score, Endre Juhasz said that Hungary would like to have this intention laid down in the preamble of the agreement, but this is not on what the country's full membership depends. An official EC response to this is expected at the next round of talks in late April at the earliest.

Situation of Slovak Minority Analyzed

AU1004074591

[Editorial Report] Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian on 4 April on page 8, on 5 April on page 10, and on 6 April on page 7 carries a 4,100-word series of articles by Frigyes Varju on the situation of Slovaks in Hungary under the headline: "To Be a Slovak in Hungary."

In this series of articles, the NEPSZAVA reporter interviews various Slovak officials in Hungary who assess the Hungarian Government's minority policy. The idea to conduct these interviews came to Varju after a statement made by Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar at the Topolcany general assembly of Public Against Violence. Upon his return from the Hungarian town of Bekescsaba, the prime minister is quoted as saying that "the registration of members of Slovak organizations" had been "a very unpleasant surprise" for him. Indeed, Slovaks in Bekescsaba had informed Meciar that many people support the Slovak national minority organization, but that "they will not put their name on a list because they are afraid that if the list is published, the people on the list could become the victims of a pogrom."

On page 8 of its 4 April issue, NEPSZAVA carries a 1,600-word report on interviews conducted with Erzsebet Uhrin, principal of the Slovak high school in Bekescsaba, Mrs. Jozsef Somogyi, regional representative of Slovaks in Delalfold, and Anna Istvan, deputy chairman of the Association of Slovaks in Hungary (the MSZSZ.) Ms. Uhrin is the first to refute Vladimir Meciar's statement: "Mr. Meciar was probably exaggerating in his speech; there is not the slightest sign of violence or extremism in Hungary." Mrs. Jozsef Somogyi adds that no Slovaks "want to leave Hungary of their own free will." Nevertheless, the NEPSZAVA article clearly shows that the situation of Slovaks in Hungary could be improved. For example, Uhrin does not deny that "there are some people who really are afraid of another forced resettlement." NEPSZAVA quotes Uhrin as saying that "it is particularly older people who are haunted by the past" because "they cannot wipe out the nightmare of the 1947-1948 population exchange." Uhrin deplores the fact that "so far, the peoples of Eastern Europe have not proven themselves capable of upholding friendly and balanced relations." Furthermore, with its in-depth reports, the Hungarian television program PANORAMA does not exactly contribute to reconciliation; Erzsebet Uhrin explains that, for its part, the Slovak national minority in Hungary does not want to complain to Slovak television reporters: "We want to settle our problems at home."

Speaking in a harsher tone, Anna Istvan believes that the Hungarian Government deals more with Hungarians abroad than with national minorities living in Hungary. NEPSZAVA quotes the MSZSZ official as saying that "politicians come and go, we tell them our woes, yet it still turns out that they know nothing. Funny how they

know everything about Hungarians beyond our borders!" NEPSZAVA notes that, more than anything, Slovaks in Hungary lack textbooks, school material, and newspapers. Asked about the measures taken by the current Hungarian Government to assist national minorities in Hungary, Ms. Istvan bitterly replies that the government has done "three things: It has provided some support for the education of our children, it has created a national minority protection office, and it has made some financial contributions to the budgets of national minority associations. Compare that to the dozens of provisions made by high-level forums for Hungarians abroad!"

One of the issues raised by Frigyes Varju's article is the difficulty to calculate the exact number of Slovaks in Hungary. For example, NEPSZAVA reports that "statistics talk of some 9,000 Slovaks, but at Hungary's 1980 census, altogether 60,000 people declared that they spoke good Slovak." Thus, we can only "estimate that there are some 100,000 Slovaks currently living in Hungary."

On page 10 of its 5 April issue, NEPSZAVA carries a 1,400-word interview with MSZSZ General Secretary Mrs. Robert Jakab on the political role of the association. Similarly to Erzsebet Uhrin, Mrs. Jakab disagrees with Vladimir Meciar's statement: "I presume that when Mr. Meciar spoke of a pogrom, he was referring to the problem encountered by Germans in Hungary. Indeed, that kind of fear is more characteristic of the German national minority than of Slovaks." Jakab admits that Slovaks "are reluctant to appear on lists," but "considering the current situation of Slovaks in Hungary, it would be very unlikely for anyone to be afraid of a forced resettlement or a pogrom." Jakab states that under the former regime, the Hungarian Government hardly did anything to assist Slovaks in Hungary. Asked by Varju whether the new government has provided any help, the official replies: "Nothing—and I am adamant when I say that." However, Mrs. Jakab believes that "it is the national minorities themselves" that should "try to cure old cramps."

Finally, on page 7 of its 6 April issue, NEPSZAVA carries an 800-word interview with Rozalia Csipka, chief government counselor, on the Hungarian Government's national minority policy. (Csipka herself is an ethnic Slovak.) Asked to comment Vladimir Meciar's statement, Csipka states that the allegation "was not based on any real facts; nobody is ordered to settle somewhere else!" Ms. Csipka is of the firm opinion that it is the national minority organizations themselves that are in charge of improving the situation of their groups. Csipka is quoted as saying that the Hungarian Government "cannot act instead of the organizations. It has enabled the organizations to function by making a few financial contributions; now it is up to the organizations themselves to use available opportunities." Nevertheless, Csipka does recognize the fact that national minorities are poorly represented in the Hungarian National Assembly: "It is a fact that this problem remains unsolved—there is no need to gloss over the truth." According to Csipka, the need for minority representation is "a justified claim, and this issue should be settled as soon as possible."

Walesa, Bielecki, Skubiszewski on Visit to France

LD0904163691 Warsaw TVP Television Network in Polish 1515 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Interview with President Lech Walesa, Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, and Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski by unidentified reporter at an unspecified airport in Poland on 9 April before their departure for France —live or recorded]

[Text] The reduction in the Polish debt and a treaty on friendship and solidarity in which, among other things, France supports our entry into the EEC, are the most important elements of the president and the prime minister's trip to France.

[Reporter] Mr. President, what are you counting on the most regarding Polish-French contacts?

[Walesa] That Poland should really join in, that we should not be isolated. I am not asking for anything. I am just making efforts so that we will not be isolated. Look how many Western goods there are in the shops. Conversely, look how few Polish goods are going the other way.

[Bielecki] We are in a difficult situation now, following the collapse of the Eastern market. Regarding the creation of new possibilities as far as our markets are concerned, it is very important for us to survive this difficult period of the transformation of the Polish economy. That is in the economic field; however, what is politically important are guarantees of our security, our incorporation within the European security system, and a striving for integration.

[Reporter] [Words indistinct] in time, the signing precisely of such military agreements, before we attempt to join NATO.

[Bielecki] For the moment, therefore, we are talking about cooperation between Polish and French military circles, (?which) certainly serves to improve the efficient functioning of our army.

[Skubiszewski] This is a rare event, this trip by the president, prime minister, and foreign minister, as well as other ministers. There will be an opportunity to raise all important problems, both Polish-French and European ones, and maybe even some global ones, because Europe is increasingly incorporated within the global community. We saw this clearly following the crisis in the Persian Gulf.

Walesa Comments on Reforms, Relations With West

PM1004075091 Paris LE FIGARO in French 6-7 Apr 91 p 3

[Interview with President Lech Walesa by Christophe Labarde and Jean-Jacques Mevel in Warsaw; date not given]

[Text] [LE FIGARO] For some time, controversy has been raging in Warsaw between you and the Bielecki government on the subject of the restitution of goods seized by the communist regime after the war. Can the opposition be overcome?

[Walesa] If only that were the only disagreement! You urged us into democracy, and now you seem surprised that we should use it. There are more than 100 political parties in Poland. Is that a good thing? Personally, I think that we must live through this emerging democracy with its faults and qualities.

[LE FIGARO] What exactly is your position on this question of restitution?

[Walesa] It is very simple: The Belweder (the Polish presidency—LE FIGARO editor's note) is not there to settle questions of detail. I am there to launch the debate and conclude it as quickly as possible.

[LE FIGARO] Who now governs Poland? Is it the government or the people around you—the Belweder, which people in Warsaw say has become a new politburo above the government?

[Walesa] In Poland, it is democracy that rules, for better or for worse. Everybody is seeking his place in the system. As president, I too am seeking my place. It is true that people are groping in the dark, but something will eventually emerge from this picture that you deem to be rather chaotic.

[LE FIGARO] The "speeding up of reforms" was the main theme of your presidential campaign. Is rivalry between the presidency and the government now likely to slow down the movement?

[Walesa] I have set a faster pace everywhere. The problem is our partners. We are knocking at the EEC's door; the EEC gives us lessons in democracy, but it refuses to receive us. We have opened the Polish market to European products, and Europe rejects ours. We want to cooperate with Europe; it is dragging its feet.

Why? According to Western criteria, we should immediately close at least 10 percent of our enterprises. That would throw Poland into chaos. Of course, I could close all the unprofitable enterprises. The result would be to send tens of thousands of unemployed Polish people to the West.

We want to sell enterprises and create joint ventures, but we are only encountering lack of understanding and distrust.

[LE FIGARO] Cooperation may be like confidence, it cannot be decreed.... What do we see in Poland? A president and a government in disagreement on a crucial subject like that of private ownership and a Parliament elected under the old regime. Even in Albania there have been free parliamentary elections.

[Walesa] Has that brought progress in Albania? In particular, why should we Poles seek the West's confidence at any price? It betrayed us during the war; it imposed Yalta on us; it lent money to the communists we were fighting. It is we who should lack confidence in the West and not the reverse.

[LE FIGARO] In the framework of rapprochement with the EEC, you mentioned a "third path." What do you mean?

[Walesa] We do not want a third path. If there is no room for us in Europe, however, we must try a different experiment just with the Czechoslovaks and the Hungarians. If you replace the iron curtain with a financial curtain, we will have no other choice.

[LE FIGARO] Your prime minister has just returned from Moscow. It seems that the question of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops deployed in Poland has still not been solved. What is the obstacle?

[Walesa] I have no shortage of arguments for showing that there is no longer any political, economic, or even logical justification for the presence of Soviet forces in our country. This does not mean that we intend to belittle them or kick them out.

The fact remains that the Soviet Union is a nuclear superpower and Poland is not; we are not in the same league.

[LE FIGARO] Some units are starting to leave Poland. A short time ago, you wanted a full withdrawal in 1991 as in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Is that still possible?

[Walesa] No. It is not that simple. Will there be enough trains to evacuate the Soviets from Poland, enough apartments to house them in the USSR? There are practical constraints.

[LE FIGARO] You will arrive in Paris on Tuesday. What do you expect your visit to achieve?

[Walesa] What I explained to you about cooperation with the Western countries was couched in rather provocative terms. I want to get things moving. It is not by saying: "I love you" that I will promote the Polish cause. I hope that cause will make progress in Paris.

[LE FIGARO] Will you ask France to cancel 80 percent of your public debt as you have done on all your foreign visits since your election?

[Walesa] I sincerely believe that Poland owes a great deal to President Francois Mitterrand. I have great confidence in him, but I cannot demand anything. I am suggesting that the French Treasury should cancel 80 percent of its credit to Poland; but just suppose that the president was prepared to give me 100 percent! (laughter)

Walesa Interviewed on NATO, Soviet Relations

AU0904184091 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 3 Apr 91 p 2

['PAD'-signed report on interview given by President Walesa to LA LIBRE BELGIQUE and LE SOIR before his visit to Brussels; place and date not given]

[Text] "We cannot allow a vacuum to develop in our part of Europe after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and CEMA. Europe has to help us in our efforts to manage this region," said President Walesa in an interview given to LA LIBRE BELGIQUE and LE SOIR before flying off to Brussels.

The president stated that Poland's geographical location in the heart of Europe had for a long time been a curse on the Poles. Today, there were advantages to be reaped from this fact. "Poland's location between East and West can be used as a bridge. What was a curse in the past can now be a blessing. I will raise the importance of the region's location and the way it can be best utilized with the leaders of the European Communities," he continued.

In reply to the questions why he would be meeting the head of NATO, Manfred Woerner, in the Polish Embassy and not at NATO Headquarters as President Havel—who also made a speech there—had done, and whether this signified that Poland did not want any rapprochement with NATO, Walesa said: "The Czechs and the Poles are seeking various and individual solutions. I have met Mr. Woerner before, but I am not going to Brussels to knock on NATO's door. We are looking into various opportunities. We want to get an overall picture of what is best for Poland. For me, it is the outcome and not the spectacular gesture that counts. The basic guarantees are already in place, because nowadays nothing in Europe can be solved by the use of force. Nobody will risk making a mess of things. In the future, new solutions will be needed and European security must be guaranteed by all countries."

Speaking on Soviet-Polish relations, Walesa expressed satisfaction that Prime Minister Bielecki was going to Moscow to discuss various matters, including trade issues. "There is still the matter of Soviet troops in Poland and there appears to be some confusion over this. It is not a question of us chasing them out, nor slighting the honor of the Soviet Army. Today the Soviet Army has absolutely no interest, be it economic or political, in maintaining a presence in Poland. Looked at in this way, it will be much easier to reach a compromise on an eventual deadline for completing the pull-out. I am pleased that Moscow has brought forward this deadline by a year, and I think that we will be able to bring it forward even more," asserted Walesa. The president said that the USSR remained a great power, even though it was undergoing an economic crisis. It remains a nuclear and military power, and one has to remember this.

Asked about internal Polish matters, namely, his preference for a fall election date, Walesa replied that the Parliament and even the presidency both stemmed from the "roundtable" agreement. On the one hand it was bad, because even Albania had overtaken Poland by the fact that it had held free elections, but on the other, everybody knew that democracy in Poland was much further advanced than in Albania, where the communists had just won the first general election. Moving the Polish election to the fall meant that political parties could prepare better for it. How could anyone assert that valid free elections were held in Albania when the country has almost no political parties?

According to Walesa, "Solidarity" will continue to exercise a controlling effect on the democratic process in the upcoming elections. "Afterward we shall have to call it a day, because we cannot continue to have a president, prime minister, and a Parliament all coming from the same political movement. After the elections, "Solidarity" will have to pass into history as a great and victorious idea that made possible a peaceful transition to pluralism in Poland. Afterward, Polish political life will have to be organized along other European models, where there has been no comparable "Solidarity" phenomenon," Walesa concluded.

Soviet Troop Withdrawal Begins 9 Apr

LD0904161791 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1200 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] At 1100 today the first part of a Soviet missile brigade left the Soviet garrison in Borne Sunilowo in the Koszalin voivodship for the Soviet Union by railroad. The Soviet side has thus commenced the withdrawal of its forces from our country. Around 10,000 troops from 30 different types of military units are planned to be withdrawn by year end. The brigade of operational tactical missiles will be entirely withdrawn from the Soviet garrison by the end of next month. It will be disbanded on Soviet territory in June.

The withdrawal of Soviet forces from our country has commenced before the signing of an intergovernmental agreement on the withdrawal.

Government Lifts Embargo on Trade With Kuwait

LD0904175591 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1700 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Excerpt] Today's meeting of the Council of Ministers lasted only one hour and 40 minutes. The meeting was chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Leszek Balcerowicz. The government adopted a draft amendment to a law on financial management of the state enterprises. The object of the amendment is to shape the law to new regulations on local self-government, to an amended budget law, and to reprivatization of enterprise property.

The government has lifted the embargo on trade between Poland and Kuwait. The members of the government have also adopted a stand toward two bills—one on legal advisers and one on the bar. It was stated that one law should concern both professions. The Council of Ministers has also discussed bills on banking system and on the Polish National Bank. [passage omitted]

Social Democrats Submit Economic Proposals

LD0504213491 Warsaw PAP in English 1901 GMT 5 Apr 91

[Text] Warsaw, April 5—Leaders of the Social-Democratic Party of Poland (SDRP) Aleksander Kwasniewski and Leszek Miller sent to President Lech Walesa the text of their party's proposed socio-economic programme, PAP was told.

"This is, at the same time, our response to your proposal of meeting with economists and politicians of various outlooks to discuss the present economic situation in Poland," SDRP leaders write to President Walesa.

Citizens' Center Coalition Formed

LD0604201691 Warsaw TVP Television Network in Polish 1830 GMT 6 Apr 91

[Text] At home the political news of the day is the creation in Warsaw of the Citizens' Center Coalition [OKC]. It is formed by the Center Accord [PC] and activists of the Citizens' Committees who accept the political program of the Accord. The coalition has invited members of Solidarity to participate in this initiative. Its declared purpose is to bring about free elections, in which it will take an active part.

In the view of Center Accord Chairman Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the participation of the Christian National Union in the electoral coalition being constructed is not possible.

The creation of the OKC was preceded by a conference of the Committee for Free Elections organized by the Center Accord. The conference brought together representatives of the Citizens' Committees, the National Citizens' Committee, Solidarity, and the Christian National Union. In the resolution that was passed, the current, contractual Sejm is described as the primary hindrance to the completion of the Polish democratic revolution. Without free elections, Poland will be neither free nor independent. We appeal to the president to engage his authority to accelerate the democratic process in Poland, the resolution reads.

Center Accord Wants Committee Chairman Recalled

LD0804162191 Warsaw PAP in English 1407 GMT 8 Apr 91

[Text] Warsaw, April 8—The Centre Alliance is planning to submit a motion to the Sejm (lower house) speaker soon to recall Professor Bronislaw Geremek from the chairman of

the Constitutional Committee because as the party claims, the work of the Committee is aimed at adopting a new constitution by the present Sejm which is unacceptable.

The alliance also charges the committee with delaying work on an electoral bill, which serves the postponing of parliamentary elections.

The Centre Alliance recognizes the right of Professor Geremek to represent a definite political option but claims that political views should not hinder the process of reforming the state nor should they adjust this process to the opinions of the party one belongs to. Centre Alliance secretary Stanislaw Rojek told PAP.

Chairman Gets Vote of Confidence

LD0904161491 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1200 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Excerpt] The members of the Sejm Constitutional Committee have granted a vote of confidence to Bronislaw Geremek as chairman of this commission, with 24 votes in favor and four abstentions. A resolution for calling such a vote was proposed by deputy Stanislaw Rogowski, and it arose from the resolution adopted on Saturday by the conference of citizens' committees called by the Center Accord, at which there appeared a demand for the recall of Professor Geremek from the post of chairman of the Constitutional Committee. [passage omitted]

Roman's 'Dictatorial Inclinations' Condemned

AU1004083291 Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 4 Apr 91 p 3

[Sorin Stefan article: "The National Salvation Front Regime—The Assault of Conservatives"]

[Excerpts] The fact that the government's reform program is not a great success has become a banal truth by now. The fact that the motives for the price liberalization are completely different from what Mr. Roman told us (the so-called wish to emphasize the "truth" in enterprises will make them work as badly as before but earn a little more) is part of the policy of disinformation practiced systematically by the prime minister. In reality, there are two causes that made Mr. Roman accelerate the process of reforms—although he did it in a more than disputable manner. First, the IMF's conditions for granting a loan to Romania were: to implement certain economic reforms in our country, reforms that can be considered at least a little credible and to bring the sale prices up to the level of the prices in the West. No matter whether these conditions are correct or not, or whether or not we like them, the latter condition was imposed on the Bulgarian government as well, thus it was forced to adopt a position similar to ours. On the other hand, the government desperately needs to compensate for the great losses suffered by enterprises through the increase of prices, something that has been dissimulated in an inconceivable manner.

With all the hesitations that we have witnessed so far, the reform must continue and in a more radical way than before. If this seems to be the position taken by Mr. Stolojan—who asked that all subsidies be canceled—the wish of the prime minister not to lose his popularity made the latter adopt a somewhat more moderate attitude. It seems that Mr. Roman has not understood yet that we have to face a decisive alternative: either we cut out deeply and categorically the metastasis of the old system or we will witness the rapid collapse of a shaking economy. [passage omitted]

While during the first part of the last year Mr. Roman was not convinced at all by the need for a transition to a market economy and got lost in demagogic declarations, the constant pressure of a number of Western countries, that asked insistently for a democratization of economic life, made the prime minister adopt a somewhat more realistic view and come up with a radical reform, at least as far as intentions are concerned. On the other hand, as a compensational move, a number of National Salvation Front [FSN] members have regrouped into a conservative—FSN 20 May—wing that opposes not only the economic reforms, which are incomplete the way they are, but also the real democratization of the country's political life.

As far as Mr. Iliescu is concerned, he has not yet clearly stated his position favoring one side or another, but he is most probably tempted to support the Barladeanu wing (taking into consideration the fact that both of them talked about an "increase of prices" rather than a "liberalization"). [passage omitted]

In Romania, tradition oscillated between anarchy and dictatorship, and we were used to an autocratic government. In accordance with this good Romanian tradition, last fall the government asked to be granted discretionary powers. Mr. Barladeanu condemned the creation of the position of FSN national leader as a first step toward the establishment of a personal dictatorship. It is true that all Mr. Roman succeeded in accomplishing was replacing the former Romanian Communist Party government with a government of "technocrats" just as little permeable to suggestions coming from the outside as its predecessors. The haste in which, right after the discussions in the Senate, the prime minister sent Mr. Stolojan to face the cameras to assure us that very soon the long awaited privatization will begin shows that Mr. Roman is determined to lead everything with a strong hand. More than that, the Front (Roman wing) was in a hurry to concoct a communique in which reference was made to party discipline and in which we were assured of the party's internal cohesion. The fact that the prime minister did not permit the resignation of Mr. Stolojan and Mr. Vatasescu show that Mr. Roman has dictatorial inclinations. [passage omitted]

Our only salvation could be if the prime minister agreed to risk his popularity and start Romania off on a road from which the maneuvers of conservative communists could not turn it back. Mr. Roman has often proved, however, that his conceitedness greatly exceeds the level of his civic awareness, we expect nothing apart from a few fictional measures and the adoption of a policy of compromise toward those who question it. [passage omitted]

Poll Shows 'Most Romanians Are Apolitical'

AU1004091791 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0759 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 10/4/1991—"A Politogram One Year After the Elections" drawn up by the Romanian Institute for Public Opinion Polling [IRSOP] comes out with interesting findings: In spite of appearances, most Romanians are apolitical.

According to the latest poll, only 12 per cent and 26 per cent of the population respectively, are very much or much interested in politics, while 45 per cent take little and 17 per cent no interest at all in it.

If new elections were held now, the National Salvation Front [FSN] would get most of the votes (31 per cent) but not even half as much as almost one year ago.

Given now four per cent of the subjects' votes, the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania would get a little more than half of the votes it had last year.

The "historical" parties would see a slight increase (the National Liberal Party gets now 10 per cent of the

subjects' yes, the Christian Democratic National Peasant Party 6 per cent) or would stagnate (the Romanian Social Democratic Party 1 per cent). Most favoured by the imagined elections would be the National Unity Party of the Romanians, close to "Vatra Romaneasca" (which is given 8 per cent), and would get thrice more votes than before. Worth mentioning is the big number of people that cannot make up their mind (17 per cent) and of those who would refuse to vote (8 per cent).

Longing after the past is by far lesser than the press puts it. Only 3 per cent of the subjects would like a restauration, while 90 are against. However, 5 per cent declare they would vote for the Socialist Labour Party (led by Ilie Verdet, former prime minister under Ceausescu) while 85 per cent say no. Here too, we have a relatively big number of people that cannot make up their mind—ten per cent. Nine per cent of the subjects however think that many would vote for that party, while 68 percent think otherwise.

The majority (71 per cent) think that the rights and freedoms have grown after the revolution while 9 per cent think that they have dropped. 15 per cent say the rights and freedoms have remained unchanged.

Only 17 per cent agree it was better under Ceausescu, while 73 per cent think it was not. Most subjects (63 per cent) rule out the possibility of reinstatement of a communist regime, while 18 per cent think it is possible.

The presidency and the government are better viewed than the Parliament. Very satisfied with the activity of the president and of the prime minister and the government are 13 per cent and 15 per cent respectively, satisfied 47 per cent and 46 per cent respectively, discontent 25 per cent and 26 per cent, very dissatisfied 10 per cent and 9 per cent respectively.

The majority (55 per cent and 56 per cent respectively) trust President Ion Iliescu and Petre Roman respectively, while the minority (31 per cent and 32 per cent) do not trust them.

The government is better regarded than the Parliament. The executive is very good to 15 per cent of the subjects, the Parliament to 8 per cent, the executive is good to 38 per cent and the Parliament is good to 36 per cent of the subjects. To 27 per cent and 20 per cent respectively, the government is bad or very bad, while the Parliament is bad or very bad to 34 per cent and 22 per cent respectively.

26 per cent of the subjects admit the accusation that the government has led the country to disaster, while 54 per cent reject it. A minority (24 per cent) demands the Roman government's resignation, while the majority (61 per cent) is against resignation.

However, most of the subjects think that the solution to the country's present difficulties is a government made with the participation of several parties (49 per cent), while 25 per cent stick to the idea of a FSN one-party government. Nine per cent would want a military rule.

Most of the subjects are afraid of the shock of price thaw. Very worried are 41 per cent, worried 33 per cent, little worried 21 per cent, not worried at all 5 per cent.

The trade unions are appreciated, the Civic Alliance is not. Seven per cent appreciate very much the unions, 41 per cent simply appreciate them, while 28 per cent and 7 per cent do not like them or do not like them at all.

The opinions on the Civic Alliance are: very good 7 per cent, good 24 per cent, bad 22 per cent, very bad 19 per cent.

Most subjects are highly appreciative (19 per cent) or only appreciative (37 per cent) of the Vatra Romaneasca Union, while 13 per cent are not appreciative and 7 per cent are not appreciative at all. 24 per cent keep silent.

The poll was taken by the IRSOP over March 26-31, 1991 with a representative sample of 2,208 persons in all counties of Romania. The possibility of error is assessed at 2 per cent.

Nationwide Shortages Blamed on Privatization

AU0904163991 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 3 Apr 91 p 1

[Raluca Stroe Brumariu article: "Privatization—the Source of All Shortfalls"]

[Excerpts] The press has written a lot about the attempt to compromise the idea of privatization by this pseudo-privatization, which has taken place in our country and which, in fact, is disappointing for everyone. The problem is surely very complex when one bears in mind that many of those who have opened private shops are former securitate members or people who currently hold positions at the various levels of the leadership. [passage omitted]

Compromising the notion of privatization by always emphasizing its negative aspects can have undesired long-term consequences. Rumors mixed with realities that are difficult to refute, the accentuation of shortages and poverty, and exaggerated prices, all these things and a restraint mentality—profoundly influenced by the 40 years of communism—have inevitably led to hostile thoughts and gradually even to a sort of irritation with the idea of privatization. Any initiative in this area is received with skepticism or even hostility by our people. [passage omitted]

A tendency to incite people (through all kinds of rumors or on television) against private owners has been noted for the simple reason that shortages in the state trade are mainly because of them; this tendency is explained by its aim: To maintain state control in all areas of activity.

The rumor factory is functioning successfully in this respect as well. [passage omitted]

The well-known scapegoat policy attempting to divert people's attention from the truly guilty ones has found fertile ground here as well.

The best ally of those in power and of the Securitate is, in fact, the communist education our people have enjoyed for more than 40 years, which is now being used in a much more shrewd way than that used by Mr. Iliescu's predecessor. Now there is a valve for the outbreak of pent-up dissatisfactions, which are well-controlled and always counteracted. People's attention is diverted from essential things and facts. [passage omitted]

As long as poverty and misery exist in Romania, the Romanian people will be suppressed and led according to someone or another's liking, because poverty breeds envy and hatred and that leads to disunity. This, combined with the precarious situation of the economy and with the incompetence proved at the highest levels, will perpetuate repression (even somewhat hidden) at home and Romania's dependence (not only economic) on certain "neighboring and friendly" countries abroad. Is this something to aspire to?

Coposu, Ratiu Attend Weekly PNT-cd Meeting

AU0904164391 Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 3 Apr 91 pp 1, 2

[Serban Sandulescu report on meeting of National Peasant Christian Democratic Party in Bucharest on 29 March: "Under the Sign of Unity of Thought and Action"]

[Excerpts] The weekly meeting of Bucharest's Fourth District of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party [PNT-cd] was held at the Bucharest Municipal History Museum Hall on Friday, 29 March, to which our party's leadership was also invited.

PNT-cd President Corneliu Coposu; PNT-cd First Vice President Ion Diaconescu; Ion Ratiu, president of the UMRL [World Union of Free Romanians] and head of the PNT-cd parliamentary group; and Mihai Mihai, president of the PNT-cd organization of Bucharest's fourth district took their seats at the presidium table. Numerous members of our party and its leadership, as well as PNT-cd devotees were present in the crowded hall.

The meeting was also attended by such guests as Professor Adrian Minzatu and Doctor Engineer Popescu, president and vice president of the Republican Party; and Mr. Nica Leon, president of the Free Democratic Party. [passage omitted]

The first one to take the floor was Mr. Corneliu Coposu. [passage omitted] Reviewing the latest events, he emphasized that the forecasts made last year have come true. In January 1990 our party demanded the privatization of agriculture and the return of properties and urban houses, which had to precede price liberalization; however, the government pursued demagogic objectives of an electoral nature.

The group of ambitious people who has hijacked the revolution of our young people did not want to bear in mind the proposals made by our party and deputies and the laws it has issued bear the mark of Marxism-Leninism, while the nomenklatura, hand in hand with the occult forces in our country, forcefully cling to power.

Mr. Corneliu Coposu then pointed out that the National Salvation Front [FSN] and its government have begun to split and stressed that they have neither creed nor any clear government platform and program and what united them so far were just material interests. A market economy cannot be achieved by Marxist-Leninists, who actually have not been able to open the country toward Europe, but instead have impoverished it and have turned the democratic institutions, which we should have, upside down. The government is to blame because it continued along the twisted road of communism and its catastrophic experiments have begun to yield fruits. [passage omitted]

Our president said that the government cannot cope with the crisis because economic restructuring is possible only by attracting foreign investments.Furthermore, the government that accused us during the election campaign of selling the country, has now reached the point of begging at the gates of Europe, while the PNT-cd has succeeded in entering Europe by becoming a full member of the Christian Democratic International in Western Europe.

President Corneliu Coposu drew attention to the system of disinformation of those in power. [passage omitted] Through their actions they been able to compromise themselves and to contribute to the opposition's solidarity. The speaker also clearly pointed out that we will by no means cooperate with the FSN, an affirmation that was punctuated with loud applause. [passage omitted]

In conclusion, President Corneliu Coposu said: "Let us have confidence in our party's program that is able to end the chaos in our country and which enjoys credibility in the West. Our objectives are: Market economy, genuine democracy, and human rights and freedoms." [passage omitted]

The floor was then taken by Mr. Ion Ratiu, head of our parliamentary group. [passage omitted] From the very beginning he opposed the deliberately erroneous idea of those in power that there was no alternative to the current government. On the contrary, "we can do better" Mr. Ion Ratiu said, because we have qualified manpower, knowledge, we are able to adjust, and Romania ranks second—after France—regarding available riches. What we need is capital in the form of investments not government aid which is not enough. To obtain them we need stability and democracy, that is credibility; the "country is waking up" and realizes that the current government cannot ensure this.

In conclusion, Mr. In Ratiu talked about the dignified way in which the PNT-cd is conducting itself in Parliament and about the determined struggle that is needed in the next elections when an important task rests on young people.

After a short remark by Mr. Corneliu Coposu, who emphasized that investments worth some $20 billion are needed for the transition to the market economy, of which the government has obtained at most 10 percent, the floor was given to the other two guests of honor at our meeting. [passage omitted]

Labor Ministry Official on Social Protection

AU0904130991 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1151 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 9/4/1991—The system of compensation for price rise will ensure the stability of the population's purchasing power in Romania for 60 per cent of the expenditures of a family of employees and 70 per cent of the expenditures of a family of pensioners, states Mihu Biji, state secretary with the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection.

Central to the employee's protection is the setting by the government by consultation with the trade unions of the minimum monthly wages that are to follow the evolution of the price and tariff indices, the state secretary mentioned. As for the pensioners, he showed that the current handout for price rise is, at least for those with small pensions, a threefold pension rise, while for those with average pensions—a twofold rise as against last October.

In the domain of social security, Mihu Biji said, the government program stipulates for this year the development of a security system to encompass all categories concerned, the elimination of the extant inequities and the alignment to the European norms in this domain. The new system will rely upon a parity administration in which those who pay the security and those who benefit by it will decide, along with the state, the policy to be promoted. Although a new legislation will be elaborated already this year in the domain of social security, pride of place is given to the remaking of the system as concerns the farmers. A new law is being drafted on farmers' pensions in keeping with the transformations agriculture is going through. The purpose is to create an economically viable autonomous social security house.

Bratianu Union Communique Rejects Totalitarianism

AU0904111691 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0902 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 9/4/1991—Faithful to its principles of favoring democracy and rejecting any kind of totalitarianism, the "Bratianu" union considers it necessary that any possible totalitarian attitude, of a totalitarian party included, be submitted to the parliament and it thinks it necessary to inform the public opinion on this choice, says a communique of this union.

Consequently, the "Bratianu" Liberal Union disagrees with the comments and obstructions made when this matter was discussed in the senate under the pretext of their being inner matters of a political party, specifies the press release signed by the chairman of the union, Deputy Ion I. Bratianu.

Journalists' National Convention Press Release

AU1004091491 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0911 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 10/4/1991—The 9 April press release of the National Convention of Romania's Journalists, "Romanian Press in the Spring of 1991", says that "the Journalists' Organizations have initiated a series of ideas and measures to encourage the moral and professional standard of journalism."

One chapter refers to the tendencies of arbitrarily limiting the freedom of the press that "have begun to shift again from the law plane to economic and administrative pressures." The first category includes the new printing fees and paper prices, and what is called "the disorder caused by the distribution of the press by Rompost-Telecom "and "nonobservance of contract discipline by printing units."

The second category includes "pressures by prefectures or local organizations of the ruling party on independent publications."

The National Convention of Journalists point to an extreme case, namely "the tendency of the state, private firms and persons to seize the daily "ADEVARUL".

Considering these data, the convention of Journalists' Organizations recommends: publication of the journalist's deontological code in as many publications as possible; gathering data on onerous contract terms at the Federation of Press Unions (SZR); measures to remove Rompost-Telecom from the press distribution network; periodical meetings with the representatives of the government to be continued.

The National Convention of Journalists took the decision to set up a commission to investigate the cases of infringement of the journalist's deontoligic code and the character of the freedom of the press.

Moldovan Foreign Minister Tiu Continues Visit

Received by President Iliescu

AU0904130591 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1246 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 9/4/1991—President Ion Iliescu received on April 9 Nicolae Tiu, minister of

foreign affairs of the Republic of Moldova, now on an official visit to Romania as guest of Romanian Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase.

Iliescu, Tiu Remark on Talks

AU0904182891 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1755 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 9/4/1991—Speaking about the Under- Secretariat for Relations with the Republic of Moldova that will open at the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Romania's president said it would be a standing body in charge of systematically supervising all joint activities in the economic, scientific, cultural, political and human relations fields.

In a statement made to the press on Tuesday, after receiving the foreign minister of the Republic of Moldova, the head of the Romanian state said on the occasion of that visit he had directly informed Moldova's leadership about his discussions in Moscow and about the friendship treaty he had signed with President Gorbachev last week in Moscow.

"As a result of the substantive issues covered by the treaty concerning direct relations with union republics, and particularly with the Republic of Moldova," the president said among other things, "We have already identified several joint actions which are going to materialize in the near future. I'm referring to a bilateral agreement in the economic field, to the opening of the two consulates in Iasi and Chisinau [Kishinev], to more border- crossing points being opened and to the creation of a Standing Under-Secretariat for Relations with the Republic of Moldova. Thus, our exchanges and contacts will increase."

In his turn, Nicolae Tiu underlined that his visit was part of a wider collaboration programme between the two foreign ministries, in accordance with the protocol signed with Romanian Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase. He said he had agreed with the latter that the two general consulates of Iasi and Chisinau start their activity within 10 days. He said 4 more border crossing points would open for citizens of the two countries.

During his meeting with the Romanian Prime Minister Petre Roman, Mr. Tiu further said, it was agreed to set up a joint commission of experts in order to speed up the preparation of an inter-governmental treaty. The first meeting of the commission will take place next week in Chisinau, he said.

CSFR's Carnogursky Visits Ethnic Minorities

AU0904131091 Prague CTK in English 1402 GMT 7 Apr 91

[Text] Bucharest April 7 (CTK)—Slovak Deputy Premier Jan Carnogursky stressed Czechoslovakia's interest in maintaining good relations with Czechs and Slovaks living abroad at a meeting with Czechs and Slovaks living in the Romanian town of Nadlac.

He was attending a session of the leadership of the Democratic Union of Czechs and Slovaks in Romania, founded more than a year ago. The community of Czechs and Slovaks living in Romania numbers about 35,000.

Carnogursky arrived in Romania after a two-day visit to Hungary.

Foreign Minister Departs for Paris, Geneva Visits

AU0904162691 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1548 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 9/4/1991—Romanian Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase left on April 9 at noon on a three-day visit to Paris and Geneva, to attend a string of events commemorating Romanian diplomatist Nicolae Titulescu.

Minister Nastase will meet on the occasion with personalities of the French political life as well as with high functionaries of the un office in Geneva.

Referring to his French and Swiss visit, Adrian Nastase stated to the journalists:

"I am making a three-day visit in Paris and Geneva to attend a string of events commemorating our great fellow countryman Nicola Titulescu, an outstanding personality of the inter-bellum European political world.

"A first event is scheduled tomorrow at the French Senate, with the participation of Senate President Alain Poher. A memorial evening is scheduled at the UNESCO Headquarters the day after tomorrow on "Nicolae Titulescu a great pioneer of European unity," with the participation of UNESCO Director-General Frederico Major.

On Friday a memorial meeting is scheduled at the UN Headquarters in Geneva, with the participation of high functionaries of the UN Secretariat and of the diplomatic corps in Geneva.

I will surely take this opportunity to have interviews with personalities of the French political life as well as with high functionaries of the UN Office in Geneva.

UN To Assist Country's Democratization Process

AU0904182791 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1800 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 9/4/1991—The head of the Romanian delegation to the EEC/UN annual session, Romulus Neagu, secretary of state at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, member of the government, had interviews with Gerald Hinteregger, executive secretary of the commission, and Jan Martenson, assistant UN secretary-general, head of the UN Office in Geneva, director of the UN Centre for Human Rights.

During the talk with the executive secretary concrete actions have been established to be held in Romania

until the end of the year—namely the work shops—with the participation of experts in the member countries in fields of great interest for the Romanian economy—current questions of the transition to the market economy, transport, metallurgy, standardization.

In that context, reference was made to Prime Minister Petre Roman's proposal concerning the calling up in Bucharest of a meeting of the countries bordering the Danube to set the bases of their complex cooperation to achieve a link between Northern and Southern Europe, to get to the northern sea and to the Black Sea-Mediterranean Sea, respectively, to initiate economic projects as well as for environmental protection. The executive secretary of the commission expressed the entire availability for the achievement of that major target.

During his interview with Jan Martenson, the head of the Romanian delegation discussed aspects of the cooperation aimed at supporting the democratization process in Romania, at instaurating the state of law. Reference was made to the effective support granted by the UN experts in human rights in drafting Romania's new constitution as well as the training of Romanian experts at the UN Centre and the Romanian Human Rights Institute.

British Agriculture Secretary Arrives for Visit

AU0804172591 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1538 GMT 8 Apr 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 8/4/1991—Mr. John Selwyn Gummer, British secretary for the Ministry of Agriculture, has arrived in Bucharest on Monday, April 8. He is the first dignitary of his country to visit post-revolution Romania.

The purpose of my visit, he told ROMPRES on his arrival, is to identify ways for a fruitful cooperation, especially now, when Romania has become a free country and a real partner for Great Britain.

The British minister is accompanied on his visit to Romania by David Rossington, personal adviser to the minister, Ross Buckland, member of the managing board of "Unigate PLC" company, and Thomas Buckle, head of the Department for Relations with Romania of the British Ministry of Agriculture.

In his turn, the Romanian minister of agriculture and food, Ioan Tipu, said:

We'll have together with our guests a rather dense programme of visits and exchanges of views. We wish to cooperate in a sincere manner with Great Britain in the privatization of agriculture, as well as in many other fields of agriculture. I hope we'll identify possibilities to that effect during Mr. Gummer's 4-day visit to Romania.

Meets With Counterpart

AU0904130691 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1229 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 9/4/1991—A round of talks took place on April 9 morning in Bucharest between British MP John Gummer, minister of agriculture, fisheries and food, who heads a delegation on a Romanian visit, and Ioan Tipu, Romanian minister of agriculture and food, assisted by Romanian experts.

They discussed matters of plant and animal production, food industry and land improvement, in view of opening new ways of collaboration and cooperation to mutual benefit.

The British delegation will see round scientific research and productive units, irrigation systems and farm steads in various zones of Romania.

Government Leaders, Bessmertnykh Assess Visit

LD0904145591 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1317 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] Belgrade, 9 Apr (TANJUG)—Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, who has been on a two-day official visit to Yugoslavia, left today from Belgrade to Athens on a visit to Greece. The guest from Moscow was seen off at Surcin Airport [Belgrade] by Federal Secretary of Foreign Affairs Budimir Loncar.

Immediately prior to his departure from Belgrade, Bessmertnykh and Loncar held a news conference in the Palace of the Federation. Analyzing the talks he had yesterday and today with Loncar, SFRY Presidency President Borisav Jovic and Federal Executive Council President Ante Markovic, Bessmertnykh said that these talks "demonstrated that we have a high level of mutual understanding and similar views on important international topics." He stressed that Yugoslav-Soviet relations are "at a high level and have good prospects." "Yugoslavia has an important place in Soviet foreign policy priorities," Bessmertnykh said, adding that Moscow assesses that the role of Yugoslavia is enormous in the world and in Europe, as well as in the Nonaligned Movement.

Loncar agreed with the assessments of his guests and said that relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR "have never been better." "They are freed from ideological prejudices and are without burdens from the past," he said.

Despite these flattering assessements, Loncar and Bessmertnykh agreed that their economic cooperation is spoiling the picture of overall relations. The two sides agree that it is vital to invest efforts so the negative tendencies that have burdened economic cooperation in the first months of this year might be removed. The Soviet foreign minister said on this occasion that the governments of the two countries would have to tackle this problem. He did not rule out a meeting between the Soviet and Yugoslave prime ministers.

Journalists were interested in the Soviet stand on the future of Yugoslavia. Bessmertnykh said that Yugoslavia plays a very significant role in the world and in Europe. "It can play such a role also in the future only if it retains its integrity. We are for an integral Yugoslav Federation. As for relations between the Federation and the republics, we hold that it is an internal matter of Yugoslavia and hope that these relations will be built on a democratic basis," Bessmertnykh said.

Bessmertnykh was asked why he did not meet with representatives of Serbia and Slovenia, who were interested in meeting him. Loncar said that it was normal to expect these meetings to be held because it is "a customary practice." As he said, "we tried to organize these meetings, but because of Bessmertnykh's short visit, it was impossible to do so."

Bessmertnykh cited as a reason that the program of his visit was too busy. He stressed that the Soviets are interested in contacts with representatives of Yugoslav republics, because such contacts would be useful, but this time there was no time for that. As for international issues, journalists were most interested in the problem of Iraqi Kurds, the Gulf and Middle East crisis, Soviet-U.S. relations, and relations between Moscow and former members of the Warsaw Pact. Bessmertnykh said that the Kurds' tragedy had international significance, and in essence it had humanitarian character. He expressed his hope that the world would be able to resolve this problem and put and end to the Kurds' troubles.

Loncar recalled the recent statement by the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs on the suffering of the Kurds, in which the Iraqi Government is severely condemned for its actions against them. "We urgently call on Iraq to take all measures to protect the Kurdish people," Loncar said, and added: "Within the Nonaligned Movement we will do everything we can to put an end to the Kurds' tragedy as soon as possible."

Zagreb Police on 8 Apr Building Protest

LD0904225291 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1847 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] Zagreb, 9 Apr (TANJUG)—In connection with yesterday's events in front of the Zagreb military court, the Zagreb police administration has issued the following statement:

"In connection with the trial of Virovitica citizens and others, the Zagreb police administration planned to and undertook a series of security measures with the aim of keeping public peace and order around the military court in Zagreb. It was planned that the number of policemen deployed would be in line with expert analysis prepared for such situations.

"Because a peaceful protest was heralded, the police presence was planned in line with the announcement, which proved to be correct in light of the fact that in the early morning hours, the protestors were not aggressive.

"Just before the trial opened, groups of citizens arrived near the military court expressing their dissatisfaction in various ways. Because the numbers were swelling, at one moment, the police were incapable of containing a mass of people who broke through towards the military court building, where they were stopped by the police cordon.

"Because some individuals acted aggressively by damaging the military court building and breaking windows, police reinforcements arrived, which pushed back the mass of citizens from the military court building, and thus prevented a further escalation of violent protest by a group of citizens.

"Immediately after public order and peace were restored, the investigating magistrate of the district court in Zagreb carried out an on-the-spot investigation. The

police administration in Zagreb is involved in a criminal investigation regarding 15 persons subsequently identified concerning whom there is an indication that as a result of their aggressive behavior they were party to disturbing public peace and order, or who have been indicated as infiltrated provocateurs of unrest. During these events no citizens or members of the police forces were injured. Moreover, there was never a threat to the safety of the persons in the military court building, none of whom was injured.

"Therefore there is no truth in the statement issued by the SSNO [Federal Secretariat of National Defense] information service claiming that MUP forces [Croatian Ministry of Internal Affairs] did not stop the demonstrators from gathering outside the military court building and that the safety of the people in the military court was in jeopardy. Especially tendentious is the part of the SSNO statement that blames MUP units for taking part in the 'provocations,' a claim that we believe requires no comment.

"The statements in which some journalists, and even individual army members, including a general on active service, call for army units' involvement in such cases obviously take no account of the consequences this justified expression of indignation on the part of Zagreb citizens could end in, if perchance, the Army had been in charge. Would we have then commented on the broken windows or would we have witnessed a far greater evil that perhaps some had hoped for, which was fortunately avoided thanks to the police action and the wisdom displayed by individuals among the Army's top-ranking officers," stresses the statement issued by the Zagreb police administration.

Demonstrators Rally Outside Court

LD0904211891 Zagreb Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] Early this evening in Zagreb, the protest against the trial of the seven detainees and Croatian Defense Minister Martin Spegelj continued less fiercely and less emotionally. Some 300 protesters divided in three groups and equipped with flags, flowers and, above all, strong voices, are shouting in support of Croatia, the Croatian Assembly, freedom, and democracy. They are demanding that the charges be quashed and that the detainees be released. They are also sounding car horns.

A strong police force has blocked all approaches to the Zagreb military court with iron barriers and armored vehicles belonging to the Croatian Ministry for Internal Affairs. Three Yugoslav People's Army armored vehicles are protecting the court entrance itself. This is not bothering most persistent protesters, however. The demonstrations are still under way.

Police Official Briefs Media on Split 'Rampage'

LD0904194591 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1341 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] Split, 9 Apr (TANJUG)—Regarding last night's events in Split, when peaceful demonstrations against the Zagreb trial turned into a rampage against anything with a non-Croatian flavor, a news conference was held today in the Split police administration. At the conference, the head of the police administration, Ratomir Vranjes, briefed journalists about the damage inflicted and the measures undertaken so far on the clarification on the entire case.

During the several hour-long rampage, windows in the Yugoslav People's Army club, the command of the naval district, the Yugoslav Tourism offices, Unis Turist, Inex Turist, Putnik and several Serbian shops were smashed. Several BORBA newsstands were also smashed, and one was set on fire. According to Vranjes, the police priority was to defend Blatine, a town quarter mainly inhabited by military personnel, where the protestors were heading after their rampage in the town center.

So far, 10 people have been detained on charges of committing criminal acts of destroying property and theft. Investigative judge Velimir Pandzic is in charge of a further investigation. The police administration also said that cooperation with the military police is good.

The municipal interparty council was in session today under the chairmanship of Mayor Onesim Cvitan. The council discussed the latest events in Split. Participants in the meeting were divided into two camps. On the hand were those who tried to justify such destructive behavior by the circumstances that Croatia finds itself. Representatives of the left-wing bloc opposed this stand by claiming that pure destructive force, which cannot be justified, was in evidence yesterday. They also stressed that nothing similar must be allowed to occur again.

Anti-Trial Protesters Riot

LD0904111891 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1007 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] Split, 9 Apr (TANJUG)—At a protest against the trial in Zagreb, which was organized on the Split seafront by branches of the Croatian Social Liberal Party, the Croatian Democratic Party, and the Croatian Democratic Community, uncontrolled riots such as have never before been seen in Split took place during the night. More than 1,000 people participated, smashing windows on several military buildings and damaging the offices of several firms with headquarters in Belgrade.

Strong police forces prevented the worst, halting the departure of the wild masses for Blatine, a suburb of Split home to many active and retired military personnel live.

A police statement about last night's disturbances is expected today.

Up to 2300 when the riots ended, apart from the damage caused to buildings of the Naval District Headquarters, the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] Club, and the Military Court, damage was also caused to branch offices of JAT [Yugoslav Airlines] and Jugobanka on the seafront in Split. Damage was also caused to a BORBA kiosk, with further damage reported in the offices of Generalturist, Putnik, and JAT in the tourist palace. Also damaged were rental vehicles with Belgrade number plates. At the height of the rioting pistols shots were heard on several occasions.

Volunteers Organized for 'Liberation' of Serbs

AU0904161791 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 2 Apr 91 p 5

[G.K. report: "Colonel—Volunteer"]

[Text] A dozen or so representatives of the right-wing royalist parties have set up a committee for enrolling volunteers who would, as they put it, "take part in the liberation of Serbs in the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina from Ustashas." In 24 hours more than 150 volunteers were enrolled. They all have their own weapons that they would take with them.

If they do not find the Army intervention satisfactory, the volunteers will set off for Plitvice in two trucks. Members of the volunteer units, as we were told, are organized according to their rank. We were told that the volunteer units have one colonel, two lieutenant colonels, four captains, and ten lieutenants. The rest are privates.

The members of the committee for volunteer units are: Aleksandar Spasic, Ilija Gligorijevic, Sinisa Vucinic, Zoran Dziklic, Zoran Milunovic, Vlatko Mrkaic, Veselin Jockovic, and Iija Backo.

Serbian Assembly Endorses Demonstrations Report

LD1004090991 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0108 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Belgrade, Apr 10 (TANJUG)—The Serbian Assembly endorsed overnight a document by its inquiry commission into the 9 March demonstrations in Belgrade, when two people were killed and over one hundred injured in clashes between police and opposition-led protesters. On that day 200 people were detained by police.

The document and a report on the three-day student demonstrations after the 9 March protest were adopted after a day-long acrimonious debate by around 100 MP's from the ruling Socialist Party and opposition parties on responsibility for the 9 March clashes and casualties. The endorsed document, as was said, afforded a general insight into the events, satisfying the Socialists but not the opposition. It was passed by 158 votes for, 27 against, and one abstention. Serbian Interior Minister Radmilo Bogdanovic's resignation, offered earlier concerning the 9 March events, was accepted when he insisted on it despite the government's suggestion to the legislature that it should not be accepted. Bogdanovic will remain in his post until a new interior minister is appointed.

Serbian Interior Minister Bogdanovic Resigns

AU1004072491 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0200 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Last night at about 0100, the Serbian Assembly adopted the report of the Board of Inquiry on the events that took place in Belgrade on 9 March this year. The report was adopted with 158 votes for, 27 against, and one abstention.

Serbian Internal Affairs Minister Radmilo Bogdanovic stuck to his earlier decision to resign from his post despite the fact that the republican government recommended that his resignation not be accepted.

As explained in the assembly, Bogdanovic will remain minister of internal affairs until the procedure of electing a new minister has been completed.

Serbian National Council Discusses Unity

AU0904144791 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 30-31 Mar 91 p 1

[Text] Belgrade—BORBA has unofficially learned that representatives of several parties met yesterday on the premises of the Serbian Writers' Association at 7 Francuska Street. The meeting was attended by Mihajlo Markovic, Milos Macura, and Slobodan Vucetic, from the Socialist Party of Serbia; Zoran Djindjic, Vojislav Kostunica, and Dragoljub Micunovic, from the Democratic Party; Slobodan Rakitic and Jovan Marjanovic from the Serbian Renaissance Movement; Jovan Raskovic, representative of the Serbian Democratic Party; and Anfilohije Radovic, metropolitan of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The meeting was also attended by Matija Beckovic, Dobrica Cosic, and Budimir Kosutic as non-party members of the Serbian National Council.

The third meeting of the members of the Serbian National Council was held behind closed doors. We have unofficially learned that it started with a polemic about Zoran Djindjic's statement to BORBA on who could be elected president of this council. Cosic reproached Djindjic for comments Djindjic made about him. There was also some polemics over the character of the council and the term "national reconciliation" itself, which is supposed to be the basis of the prepared draft declaration. The participants in the meeting also heard the letter sent by Serbian Renaissance Movement President Vuk Draskovic, who demanded among other things that the representatives of the Socialist Party of Serbia not take part in the work of the council until the March events have been clarified.

Poll Views Popularity of Serbian Parties

AU0704145191

[Editorial Report] Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian on 1 April on pages 14 and 19 carries an unattributed 4,500-word report on the results of a public opinion poll on the popularity of Serbian political parties in Belgrade, Belgrade citizens' views on Serbian President Milosevic, and their views on the future of Yugoslavia. The poll was carried out by the Belgrade Institute for Political Studies on behalf of BORBA.

The report, which is entitled "Older People Support the Ruling Party, Younger People Support Opposition," does not contain any information about the poll itself, but states that the "poll researchers used the same methodology, the same sample, and the same team of people that were used to conduct the poll of 3 December 1990 which produced the most accurate prediction of the outcome of the December elections in Serbia." There is no reference to the number of people polled. (Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian on 3 December 1990 published the results of a public opinion poll on Slovenia's session carried out in Slovenia itself, and not a poll on the Serbian elections)

The results of the poll are presented in several pie charts and tables as follows:

Table 1. "Who would you vote for if elections were held in Serbia today?" (table heading) (a pie chart with figures in percentages)

1. United Opposition of Serbia (UOS)	49
2. Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS)	29
3. Some other party	3
4. Would not vote	19

Table 2. "Party affiliation of the electorate after March events" (table heading) (a pie chart with figures in percentages)

1. Socialist Party of Serbia	29
2. Democratic Party	22
3. Serbian Renewal Movement	16
4. Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia and Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative	7
5. People's Radical Party	3
6. Peasants Party	1
7. Other parties	3
8. Would not vote	19

Table 3. "Number of Supporters in Percentages" (table heading)

Age	SPS	UOS	Other parties	Undecided
up to 25	15.8	76.3	5.3	2.6
26-35	21.1	56.1	2	20.8
36-45	24.6	43.9	8.7	22.8
46-55	40.9	40.9	2.1	16.1
over 55	46.5	30.2	2.3	21

Table 4. Electorate's Education

Level of education	SPS	UPS	Other parties	Undecided
semi-qualified	60	28.6	2.8	8.6
qualified	35.9	38.5	2.5	23.1
secondary and college education	23.5	55.3	1.5	19.7
university	12.1	57.6	9.1	21.2

Table 5. "Respondents' views on the recently heard demand that Slobodan Milosevic resign" (table heading) (a pie chart with figures expressed in percentages)

1. I agree	36
2. I do not agree	41
3. Do not know	23

Table 6. "Respondents' views on how Slobodan Milosevic behaved during the March events" (table heading) (a pie chart with figures in percentages)

1. Correctly	36
2. Incorrectly	31
3. Like a dictator	28
4. Do not know	5

Table 7. "Respondents' views on who issued the order for firearms to be used at the 9 March demonstrations" (table heading) (a pie chart with figures in percentages)

1. Radmilo Bogdanovic (interior minister)	40
2. Slobodan Milosevic	26
3. Nobody	29
4. Do not know	5

Table 8. "Respondents' views on whether it is possible to preserve Yugoslavia" (table heading) (a pie chart with figures in percentages)

1. It is possible	63
2. It is not possible	26
3. No opinion	11

The report also deals with the resignation of SFRY Presidency President Borisav Jovic. According to the report, "58.6 percent of Belgrade citizens think that Jovic's resignation was an extremely moral act by a man who felt powerless at the time when the work of the SFRY Presidency was deliberately blocked, 21.3 percent did not agree with that decision, and 20.1 percent did not have a view on this." According to the report "37.2 percent thought that tendering and then withdrawing the resignation was an irresponsible act and that therefore it is not surprising that everybody is laughing at us, 40.6 percent did not agree with this, and 22.2 percent did not have a view on this."

The report also states that "48 percent of Belgrade citizens thought that the Serbian Assembly acted correctly when it rejected Jovic's resignation, 33.5 percent did not agree with this, and 20.5 percent did not have a view on this."

Terazije Activists Await Serbian Assembly Action

AU0904191591 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Radovan Pantovic report]

[Text] It is livelier than it has been in the last few days around the Terazije fountain in the center of Belgrade, where the Terazije Forum is collecting a petition.

Several dozen activists of the Terazije Forum, students, and Belgrade citizens are in Terazije Street at the moment. Signatures are still being collected for the Terazije petition, which already contains more than 100,000 signatures.

The basic message of the Forum is that they will remain in Terazije Street until the end of today's session of the Serbian Assembly. If the final outcome of the Assembly debate is not the right one, that is to say, if the students' demands are not met and the resignation of [Serbian] Internal Affairs Minister Radmilo Bogdanovic is not accepted, the Forum will call on the students and citizens of Belgrade to begin peaceful demonstrations.

There are several banners at the Terazije fountain: Day 30; Stay with us; We will wait for the end of the Assembly here; We are watching you.

Initiative for Establishing 'Third Yugoslavia'

LD0904224891 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1130 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] Belgrade, 9 Apr (TANJUG)—In contrast to the current Yugoslavia, the capital of the third Yugoslavia must not be the same city as the Serbian capital, "so the possibility of Serbian unitarism is finally eradicated and conditions are created for all citizens of Yugoslavia to feel at home in the capital," an initiative for setting up a movement for the third Yugoslavia, developed by the Movement for the Unification of Serbia and Montenegro, states.

The Movement proposes that Serbo-Croat, that is, the Croat-Serbian language is the official language, for use in the capital of the third Yugoslavia and all federal institutions.

In the third Yugoslavia, the Croatian Republic, according to the initiative, should have the autonomous province of Dalmatia and the province of Serbs, which would encompass Banija, Lika, and Kordun.

Bosnia-Hercegovina would be divided into two republics (the Republic of Bosnia and the Republic of Hercegovina), or Hercegovina, if willing, could become an autonomous province within Bosnia.

A decision whether it is better for Slovenia and Macedonia to be transformed into federal autonomous provinces or to remain republics, must be made by citizens of Slovenia and Macedonia.

Likewise, it is up to citizens of Serbia and Montenegro to decide whether these two republics will unify or remain disunited, the initiative says.

The third Yugoslavia must be a republic with the classical presidential system, the Movement for the Unification of Serbia and Montenegro, which drafted the 21-point initiative for the third Yugoslavia, states.

Slovenia Ends Military Exercises 'Successfully'

AU0904145991 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE in Serbo-Croatian 26 Mar 91 p 6

[Z. Odic report: "War Games Without the Yugoslav People's Army]

[Text] Ljubljana, 25 Mar—The three-day exercises by the Slovene Territorial Defense are over. They were, judging by everything, completed successfully. This is also confirmed by all the assessments and statements made in the Slovene media. Other journalists were not able to report on these exercises because they were not invited—Yugoslav newspaper correspondents were, for instance, not informed about these exercises and even if some journalists wanted to attend them, they were "sent back" by the polite policemen. This happened to the journalists of NARODNA ARMIJA, the paper that would normally report on such "war games." It is obvious that these "war games" were different from those that we are used to. Mobilization plans have been checked. Almost 92 percent of those called to attend these

exercises responded to the call. The volume of activities conducted during these three days was equal to the volume activities conducted during the normal exercises of the Territorial Defense and the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] over a period of five days. The exercises rehearsed anti-terrorist operations and the repulsion of air attacks. At the end of the exercises the units that took part were inspected in front of Ivan Oman, member of the Slovene Presidency, who, as DELO reported, said: "I am proud to be standing in front of the Slovene Army again after so many years." There was also a showing of a film about the conditions under which the Slovene Territorial Defense was conceived and formed; the taking over of the command of the Territorial Defense units; the arming of the Slovene Territorial Defense units with the SAP-80 rifles bought abroad and the Ambrus portable rocket launcher; and the way the Territorial Defense was reorganized—the number of regional commands was reduced from 13 to seven; there are 26 communal commands of the Territorial Defense; there are 78,000 armed people who are organized in 12 brigades and 10 detachments that are, as stated, an armed force that enables Slovene politicians to say "no" to all those who threaten Slovenia's sovereignty.

Where do the strategists of the Slovene Army expect an attack on Slovenia's sovereignty to come from?

The exercises were held between Kocevje and Ljubljana and between Novo Mesto and Ljubljana, and featured motorized units from the Primorska territorial defense units. Judging by the withdrawal of these units, one could, and one does not have to be a strategist, conclude that the western border of Slovenia remained undefended and that the concentration of defense shifted to the east, on the rivers Kupa and Sutla where there are no state borders, but which does not mean that there will not be state borders later. In other words, the defense assumed that the attack on Slovenia's sovereignty will come from the East, that is, from Croatia. Of course, this does not mean that Croatia will attack Slovenia. This was either a matter of the tactics of "one never knows," or the simple fact that the command of the Fifth Military District, which Slovenia still belongs to, is situated in the east, as are the JNA units stationed in Slovenia. According to the statements made by the organizers of the exercises, they were attended by 76 observers and 36 guests. The rumor among journalists is that they could not attend the exercises because they were also attended by the Croatian Defense Minister Martin Spegelj. Among those invited (and this is repeated in almost all news programs or all reports in DELO) was General Konrad Kolsek, commander of the Fifth Military District, who did not accept the invitation. He did not accept the invitation probably because of all these reasons, and probably because for the first time such exercises were not jointly conducted by JNA units and the Territorial Defense units. It is claimed that the JNA had been invited to take part in the exercises but that they did not reply. Considering that the SFRY Presidency, which appoints commanders of the republican territorial defense commands, did not approve the appointment of Janez Slapar as the head of the Slovene Territorial Defense, then it is clear why the JNA units and its officers could not take part in these exercises, and why the JNA and its officers are undesirable (to put it mildly) to the Territorial Defense of Slovenia and its leadership.

In any case, the clearest thing in all this is why the aggressor is expected to come from the east.

Bulatovic Presents Montenegrin Initiative

LD0904165991 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1418 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] Titograd, 9 Apr (TANJUG)—Following talks in Split and Belgrade, and before a forthcoming meeting between presidents of republics or republican presidencies in Kranj, Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic today read out to journalists a statement of the Montenegrin Presidency, which he stressed, contains an initiative for the settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. The statement, which was officially sent to the SFRY Presidency, the SFRY Assembly, the Federal Executive Council, and republican presidents or republican presidencies, reads:

"Despite undoubted efforts to resolve the crisis in a peaceful and democratic way, Yugoslavia is now living in an atmosphere of widespread conflicts. Strained interethnic relations, dramatic social and economic problems, and the evident incapability of political and state factors to stop and divert negative trends turned Yugoslavia into a possible hotbed of civil and national large-scale catastrophe. The situation that we are now experiencing should thus mark the beginning of overall sobering up and the initiation of concrete actions leading to peace, reasonable behavior, and democracy.

"Different forms have been used within the scope of activities taken so far to reach an agreement on the political future of Yugoslavia, and particularly to create conditions for the functioning of the federal state in the transitory period. The absence of concrete results, however, additionally instigated present conflicts and brought about increasing dissatisfaction and anxiety.

"The Montenegrin Presidency believes that the talks on the political future of the country have entered a critical phase. If they continue at the present rate and produce the same results, they will lose every rationale and will move the citizens and the peoples of Yugoslavia from democratic solutions. Objectively speaking, the course of the talks held so far does not pay proper attention to the fact that that the two dominant and contrasting concepts of a settlement in Yugoslavia (a federation of states or a federal state) have their common denominator in the endeavors and publicly accepted commitment that their

implementation will not pose a threat to peace, democracy, and respect for equal rights of other peoples and all citizens of Yugoslavia.

"Nor is it accepted that the efforts to secure full emancipation of Yugoslav peoples and the statehood of the republics are not at odds with the need to preserve Yugoslavia's unity. There is an interdependent relationship between the sovereignty of citizens, sovereignty of the peoples, republics, and the federal state in all constitutional-legal systems of federal states. In line with this, the republics, in the interest of their citizens, transfer part of their sovereignty to the federal state in whose services they make decisions on the basis of equal representation and full equality. A citizen-based shared sovereignty is a civilized answer to the question of how to live better, more rationally, and more equitably. It is quite obvious, on the other hand, that the present heralded degree of disintegration of Yugoslavia will not resolve the political, economic, social, and all other problems of Yugoslavia.

"The basic question that needs to be answered in a democratic way is whether political will exists to preserve Yugoslavia. It can naturally survive only as a democratic community of its citizens and equal Yugoslav nations. Montenegrin citizens expressed their own will in free elections, maintianing that such a state is a precondition for the complete and rapid emancipation and realization of their civil rights and liberties, as a basis for sovereignty of every republic. Differing political will of legally and legitimately constituted government bodies may not be the reason for the cessation of existence of Yugoslavia because it would really be an undemocratic act that would certainly be implemented with difficulty in peaceful conditions.

"Peace and democracy must always be an ultimate social value and the framework within which solutions should be sought must respect existing realities; divisions into winners and losers have to be avoided, well-meant advice from the European and international democratic public has to be accepted, and a mature political compromise has to be created.

"Maintaining that elements exist for rapid agreement on the political future of Yugoslavia on the basi of the activities of political units and experts that have been taken so far on the examination of issues from the scope of human and civil rights and liberties, economic system, systems of security, defense and international and legal position, the Montenegrin Presidency is presenting an initiative that aims immediately, starting with the forthcoming meeting between repubican presidents in Ljubljana:

"First, clearly and unequivocally to define the political interests and objectives of each republic.

"Second, on the basis of objectively different views, to open a debate in the republican assemblies and in the federal assembly and devise the possibility of a democratic referendum of all citizens of Yugoslavia on the key issues of the political future of the country.

"Third, with the participation of experts, to explain objectively to the citizens the advantages and shortcomings of individual concepts of surmounting the crisis, all the arguments being fully available to the public.

"The Montenegrin Presidency believes it is very important to remind all the participants in the talks held so far that democratic solutions can be achieved only if every participant is ready to make a step toward such a solution displaying full responsibility for the interests of the citizens and peoples they represent and respecting such interests and needs of others as well.

"Everyone is called upon with his earnestness and political commonsense in the decisionmaking process to prove his ability of being able to contribute to a peaceful and democratic solution of the crisis. In this context, the state-forming character of the Montenegrin people, territorial indivisibility, integrity and sovereignty of Montenegro, and the totality of the civic rights of all its inhabitants cannot be jeopardized as a result of a decision by any state unit. The inalienable right to decide about its future belongs to the citizens of Montenegro."